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Joint Letter on Digital Services Act

We are writing to you on behalf of some of the most innovative tech startups and scaleups who are leading the charge to make Europe one of the leading digital economies in the world.

We have been following the negotiations on the Digital Services Act (DSA) closely and are pleased to see the progress that has been made so far on legislation that will define Europe’s digital economy for decades to come. However, we remain concerned that some of the proposals under discussion may run counter to the ambitious and innovative digital goals Europe has, and we urge them to consider the following:

  • Enable businesses to continue to use targeted advertising as a means to connect with customers across the single market. Targeted advertising is a crucial tool for businesses looking to grow, innovate and sustain themselves and moves to heavily restrict it will harm their competitiveness.

  • Ensure that online marketplaces are not weighed down by disproportionate obligations. Online marketplaces are critical for ensuring a vibrant and innovative digital European economy. Requiring online marketplaces to undertake random checks of traders’ goods while carving out identification rules for SME traders may incentivise marketplaces to remove some of them off the platform due to the riskiness of hosting some traders. This will hinder further innovation and growth.

  • Ensure user redress systems are not overburdened. The high level of obligations required by the DSA will mean that intermediary service redress mechanisms will be overwhelmed. If a user is to receive a notification every time there is an action taken that impacts on visibility, ranking or demotion, there will be an unmanageable and overwhelming level of notifications for users to receive and intermediary services to manage. The most effective user redress mechanisms are those that are quick, user friendly and efficient. Additionally, policymakers should refrain from expanding redress for users flagging content under a platform’s Terms and Conditions. Platforms receive an enormous number of unfounded and erroneous user flags every day. To allow expansive redress for these flags is more than disproportionate; it could impair user safety by requiring online platforms to divert resources to dealing with groundless appeals.

The DSA is a significant change in Europe’s digital rules and will reverberate for many years to come. As we enter the final stretch of the negotiations, we are confident that policymakers will find the right balance to achieve an ambitious and innovative digital future for all.

Signatories:
– Digital Future for Europe
– Developers Alliance
– ZPP Poland
– Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic
– Finnish Federation for Communications and Teleinformatics
– Digital Poland

www.digitalfutureforeurope.com

 

See more: Joint Letter on Digital Services Act

CDA joint letter on EDPB guidance legal consistency with DSA

Brussels, 28 April 2022

 

European Data Protection Board

As a Coalition of Digital Ads (CDA) of SMEs we appreciate the European Data Protection Board’s efforts to bring greater clarity and awareness of how social media platform interfaces are designed. We believe that manipulative practices which do not respect GDPR and which hinder the ability of users to effectively protect personal data and make conscious choices should be minimised. All of those goals should be achieved while avoiding legal uncertainty and mixed signals.

What is paramount is that SMEs get clarity on how practices are associated with targeted advertising and “dark patterns”. While the guidance provided by EDPB provides a helpful guide on identifying and avoiding dark patterns in social media platform interfaces, it still does not provide a precise definition nor an exhaustive list.

While the EDPB’s guidelines are intended for GDPR compliances, the Digital Services Act (DSA) also addresses dark patterns. Any additional guidelines or regulations will have to be aligned with the DSA wording for clarity. Similarly, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) must be considered which regulates dark patterns for consumer protection. It will therefore be important to ensure the text is precise in its description of dark patterns. Ideally this should specify that the term refers to manipulative design choices that materially distort the behaviour of an average user. However this should not lead to an outright ban on ads practices, which may be justified in some
circumstances.

The EDPB guidance similarly needs to ensure consistency with the DSA text and the relationship between the two should be clearly outlined. With proposed guidelines there is a risk of creating even more incompatibility between the various European regulations on dark patterns and further complications regarding compliance and execution. The DSA’s definition of “compliance by design” for online marketplaces might also interfere with the outcomes of the proposed guidelines.

Almost all small businesses in Europe depend on digital channels to find new audiences, market to them and convert them to customers. European economic integration is dependent on the ability of SMEs to expand, grow and ultimately reach consumers throughout Europe. However, unlike large corporations, SMEs do not have the resources for large-scale marketing campaigns reliant on organic tools. What SMEs need is legal coherence, clarity and certainty to know what practices they must avoid and what they may utilise. Guidance must be clear on the outlined issues as legal expertise is a costly expense for SMEs if they are to navigate the wealth of different regulations
addressing dark patterns.

We hope that the voice of SMEs will be reflected in any upcoming digital communications regulations and guidelines. We remain open for further engagement in the process.

 

Co-signatories

 

The Coalition for Digital Ads (CDA) of SMEs supports thousands of SMEs that power Europe’s economy. Established by members of SME Connect in November 2021, CDA gives a voice to concerns over the EU draft proposals to initiate restrictions on personalised digital advertising across the EU and the impact a ban could have on SMEs, thus providing a necessary balance in an important debate. More about CDA: https://www.smeconnect.eu/cda/

Position of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers on the Consumer Credit Directive review

Warsaw, 26 April 2022 

 

Position of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers on the Consumer Credit Directive review

 

The European Commission has proposed a new Directive regulating consumer credit in June 2021.[1] The proposal is intended to replace the existing Consumer Credit Directive of 2008.[2] The draft rationale states that the current legal Act has not fully met its objectives, and therefore a revision is necessary. The aim is to introduce provisions that provide a clear legal framework for the financial industry’s economic activities and adapt regulations fit for the digital transformation. The rapidly expanding possibilities of electronic payments and socio-economic trends following it are causing consumers to change their habits in favour of the use of tools that have not yet been legally regulated.

The change in consumers’ behaviour necessitates an appropriate technological adaptation of financial products. This is due to the progressive digitalisation of commerce, payment methods and financial services. As a result, creditworthiness assessment mechanisms are often based on automated decision-making systems and products information is commonly provided in electronic form. The legislation aims to harmonise laws at the European level and strengthen consumer protection.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) recognises the need to revise the provisions of the Consumer Credit Directive. We believe that it should create a legal framework that stimulates the development of the financial technology sector, which is undergoing significant changes and not make excessive barriers to the development and innovation of European businesses. Regulation should seek to strengthen consumer protection and increase consumer welfare in the digital environment through access to modern and secure digital tools. In our analysis of the proposal’s text, we identified several solutions in the draft that may be detrimental to the development of FinTechs in Europe and negatively affect the quality of available digital tools and consumer satisfaction with their use. In the following position paper, we set out our concerns regarding the revision proposal.

Buy-Now-Pay-Later

The development of FinTechs in Europe is very dynamic. There are already over 300 such companies in Poland, and the vast majority of them are young enterprises not older than 4 – 5 years.[3] The lack of regulations excessively limiting the use of modern digital tools is of great importance for the development of financial technology companies. Currently, the fastest-growing functionality in e-commerce is the ‘buy-now-pay-later. This enables the consumer to purchase online and pay later with no fee (or a very low fee). This instrument kicked off in Sweden and has become popular in Scandinavian countries. It is now rapidly gaining popularity in Europe as the e-commerce sector develops. The data presented shows BNPL’s share of the total e-commerce payment industry at 7.4 per cent of the European market, over 20 per cent share in the Swedish market and only four per cent lower share in the German market. This positions BNPL as an ordinary payment instrument for European consumers.

Access to secure financial services is beneficial to consumers and allows them to fulfil their daily needs. Low-interest (or interest-free) online loans are, as a rule, low-rate financial instruments. Therefore, they are not equivalent to high-value bank loans to purchase a house or a car. BNPL has a low risk of increasing consumer insolvency. BNPL operators offer many solutions to fit the product to the customer’s needs. However, the ability to create tailored offerings for customers may be limited due to disproportionate regulatory burdens on operators, which may lead to the creation of instruments that are unintuitive and incomprehensible to consumers.

Creditworthiness assessment

The creditworthiness requirements introduced by the proposed Directive should be customised to the type of financial commitment. The different lengths and costs of credit should determine the adequate assessment of credit risk in relation to the actual threat of insolvency. Socio-economic factors should influence the distinction between BNPL as a flexible payment option, loans with a high-interest rate or additional charges and products with a high commitment amount. Furthermore, e-commerce companies have their own reliable debt risk assessment systems based on online purchase history or credit fraud databases. This makes BNPL a low-risk service which should be reflected in the proposed Directive. In addition, it is a service characterised by immediate execution, so the traditional method of credit assessment based on manual verification of documents, such as income certificates, is inadequate for the needs of e-commerce and more costly than an assessment based on automated systems. Consumers may be reluctant to share their documents online, or it may prove too burdensome. As a result, this would be at the loss of FinTech companies and exclude some consumers from accessing credit tools.

Low-value loans

The current Act includes under the scope loans between €200 and €75,000. The proposed Directive extends its provisions to all loans with a value equal to or less than €100,000. This means that the Directive provisions will cover small purchases using BNPL.

Many BNPL users do not perceive this financing method as a loan. This is due to the tool’s flexibility, which can be tailored to the needs of a specific offer. It can take the form of a delayed repayment for a set period (e.g. 30 or 60 days), or it can be spread in instalment. Another possibility is to buy ‘on trial’ without making an immediate payment. Free trial shopping is complementary to the online shops’ free returns policies. The above makes it difficult for the consumer to associate BNPL with classic consumer credit. It is also not entirely clear how the different types of BNPL should be classified. Depending on the service provided, it can take the form of various contact obligations known to law.

Pre-contractual information obligations

Another factor that may negatively affect the development of innovative financial products may be the excessive pre-contractual information obligation enshrined in the draft Directive. FinTech products are becoming increasingly popular thanks to simple and transparent rules. This is a major difference from traditional banking products, burdened with restrictive information obligations. Loan amounts in BNPL are low and short-term, so there is no need to provide detailed information on held commitments.

Moreover, a large number of users purchase through mobile devices. Consequently, BNPL is also most commonly used for purchases via mobile phones or tablets. The introduction of a broad information obligation will result in the illegibility of the proposed offer. It may result in the unclarity of the service to the consumer’s detriment. In addition, it might lead consumers to give consent without knowing the actual terms of the agreement. This can lead to a dangerous situation called ‘consent-fatigue’. This is a phenomenon where the user is presented with a large amount of information to read and accept before using a product or service. A large amount of information shown causes a feeling of overwhelm on the consumer, who wants to use the tool as efficiently as possible without time-consuming familiarisation with voluminous information content. This psychological effect leads to a threat to the consumer’s attention who, accepting the rules without familiarisation, may fall prey to fraud and accept unfavourable conditions. This is a negative phenomenon resulting from a disproportionate information obligation on the operator. Considering the above, we believe that the increased information obligation will not benefit the consumers if an effective way of presenting and prioritising the information is not ensured.

In conclusion, we recognise the need to review consumer credit legislation and adapt it to the new demands of digital transformation. However, we note that specific provisions of the new Directive may halt the dynamic development of FinTech companies in Europe and be detrimental to consumers. Given the importance of consumer protection in the line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU and the legislative activity of the European Institutions, there is no doubt that the welfare of consumers is a value that should be paramount when creating a new law. For this reason, we urge European legislators to consider the comments made above in order to make the provisions of the Consumer Credit Directive the most beneficial to the European economy.

***

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/new_proposal_ccd_en_3.pdf

[2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0048

[3] https://www.ican.pl/b/jak-wyglada-polski-fintech-rzut-oka-na-branze/PMQpOzRdk

 

See more: 26.04.2022 Position on the review of the Consumer Credit Directive

The companies that decided to continue their operation in Russia have nothing to do with “the social responsibility of the business” And what does their fair CIT settlement in Poland look like?

Warsaw, 8 April 2020

 

The companies that decided to continue their operation in Russia have nothing to do with “the social responsibility of the business” And what does their fair CIT settlement in Poland look like?

REPORT OF THE UNION OF ENTREPRENEURS AND EMPLOYERS

 

The disgusting and unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread ostracism and consumer boycotts. The broad scope of the sanctions meant that some companies had limited choice as far staying in Russia goes. Companies in the banking, energy or high-tech sectors have had to submit to decisions ordering to halt the trade immediately. The only companies that had a say in all of this were the ones of the retail and manufacturing sectors. Most of them have made this decision on their own – and in the eyes of the ZPP the only right decision there is – to leave this country. But not all of them.

ZPP has made a decision to look into the companies that have chosen to stay in Russia. Continuing our series of publications on how some multinational corporations go about their tax settlement, we have turned our attention to entities that have decided to continue doing business in the Russian Federation. In the course of the analysis it turned out that a significant number of these entities pay marginal income tax in Poland – in many cases, in relation to their revenues and the scale of their activity, multiple times lower than in Russia.

Companies like to boast about their social responsibility, but the real value of these declarations is verified in moments of trial, when basic decency has to be demonstrated – says Jakub Bińkowski, member of the board and director of the Law and Legislation Department at ZPP.

Maintaining the decision to continue operating in Russia feeds the aggressor’s budget and generates funds for the war-related activities. This is difficult to understand, all the more so since doing business in the country now involves gigantic risks and the purchasing power of Russian consumers is consistently decreasing. We are not particularly surprised that those who have decided to continue operating in this country, despite everything that’s happening, pay almost symbolic CIT in Poland. However, this is an additional reason why urgent reform of the tax system is necessary. Especially since the same entities pay much higher sums to the Russian budget – adds Jakub Bińkowski.

However, the information presented in the report is also a reminder of the extent to which companies remaining on the Russian market contribute to the country’s budget, also by paying corporate income tax. They are thus becoming sponsors of Vladimir Putin’s regime and, indirectly, of the ongoing war-related activities.

Leaving aside the current context, this phenomenon once again shows how inefficient the Polish tax system is, particularly in the area of tax paid by capital companies. We have repeatedly argued that CIT is de facto voluntary, as it is paid only by those entities that do not engage in tax optimisation.

Companies cited in the report include Makro Cash&Carry, Auchan, Astrazeneca Pharma, Decathlon, Leroy Merlin, but also Rockwool, Bonduelle, Total Polska (Totalenergies Group), Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals and Schneider Electric. It turns out that these companies have not only decided to stay in Russia, but also systematically pay CIT at a fraction of a percent of revenue.

We went a step further in our analysis and checked what the tax practice of the same companies looks like on the territory of the Russian Federation – says Kamila Sotomska, deputy director of the Law and Legislation Department of the ZPP.

– Logically, the same entities that do not pay CIT in Poland would not pay it in Russia in order to maximise global profit. Well, apparently not. Let’s take Leroy Merlin – in 2020 alone it paid almost three times as much tax in Russia as it did for nine years in Poland. Auchan paid five times more to the Russian budget in 2020 than to the Polish tax in 2012-2021 – she stresses.

More details in our report: How much CIT do companies that stayed in Russia pay in Poland?

Opinion of the Chief Energy Technology Specialist at The ZPP: achieving energy autonomy requires additional legislative action

Warsaw, 6 April 2022

 

Opinion of the Chief Energy Technology Specialist at The ZPP: achieving energy autonomy requires additional legislative action

 

On Thursday, 31 March, a signing ceremony took place for an appeal to unlock investment opportunities in onshore wind energy. Known as ’10H law’, it can be considered a key piece of legislation for the Polish energy sector in the context of the country’s current geopolitical situation. As a result of the war in Ukraine, energy independence is becoming a priority both politically and economically. This is an aspect that requires us to act in an extremely quick and focused manner.

The only sources that can rapidly replenish our energy balance in the near future – significantly increasing the supply of energy – are onshore wind farms and large-scale solar sources. ZPP has been calling for a special legislative priority to streamline these investments for a long time, presenting the benefits for the entire Polish economy of such projects.

In the face of a rapidly increasing green energy deficit, both of these sources are crucial, especially for companies exporting to European markets. Investments in the developing distributed energy also have an impact on the security level in the country. The war in Ukraine has shown how easy it is to take over large power stations and the consequences this can have on a security level in the country. In contrast, it is more difficult to disrupt a million of small, distributed solar and wind installations.

We believe that every action towards increasing security and achieving energy independence in Poland should be strongly supported, hence our decision to join the appeal for a quick unblocking of investment in onshore wind energy. This is particularly important if we want to save a certain proportion of our coal-fired power generation from political death, and thus obtain the Union’s approval to extend the process of moving away from coal. Only consistent action in this area can ensure our energy autonomy.

The development of distributed energy will be important for the entire Polish economy, provided that it is an integral part of the whole programme of energy transformation in the country. The recently presented assumptions for the revision of the Energy Policy of Poland assume dynamic development of this form of energy, so we hope that the rapid restoration of investment opportunities for onshore wind energy will be one of the most important objectives of the Polish government.

We would like to once again draw attention to the enormous potential offered by the development of large-scale solar sources on post-industrial areas. A large part of these places is in the hands of state-owned companies with investment and connection capacities. The only problem in this case is the exceedingly long time it takes to obtain building permit.

Legislative shortening of the deadlines for issuing these permits on post-industrial and post-mining sites would give us an additional 4 to 5 GW of green power in just 3 to 4 years. Amending the Wind Power Investment Act that would liberalise the 10H rule provide another 5 – 7 GW of capacity, thus making the achievement of 20 – 25 GW of installed green powers in 2027 fully feasible. This, in turn, translates into 40 to 45 terawatt hours of energy per year, which would come from distributed onshore installations.

Based on the above calculations, it can be assumed that in 2027 we would be able to produce 25-30% of our energy solely from land-based, distributed and renewable sources, and this would already constitute a clear step towards Poland’s energy sovereignty. We turn to the decision-makers and urge them to act quickly in proceeding and passing the necessary legislation that will enable us to achieve autonomy in the area of energy supply.

 

Włodzimierz Ehrenhalt
Chief Energy Technology Specialist at the ZPP

 

See: 06.04.2022 Opinion of the Chief Energy Technology Specialist at The ZPP: achieving energy autonomy requires additional legislative action

The stance of the ZPP on the Act of 7 April 2022, on special arrangements to prevent the promotion of aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security

Warsaw 12 April 2022 

 

The stance of the ZPP on the Act of 7 April 2022, on special arrangements to prevent the promotion of aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security

 

On 30 March 2022, the draft law on special arrangements to prevent the promotion of aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security was submitted to the Polish Sejm. The law aims to restrict the activities of persons and entities linked to Russia, which on 24 February 2022 attacked Ukraine, as well as Belarus, which supports the Russian Federation in these actions. The bill was very quickly adopted by the Sejm by a large majority – 445 in favour, 0 against and 11 abstentions. The bill has been forwarded to the Senate and will most likely be passed and signed by the President in the coming days.

This project focuses on the possibility of ‘freezing’ the assets of individuals and entities linked to Russia and Belarus that support aggression against Ukraine. Entities from these countries will also not be able to participate in tenders organised under the public procurement procedure. In addition, individual persons may be included in the list of foreigners whose residence in the territory of the Republic of Poland is undesirable. These are, therefore, relatively comprehensive measures to eliminate both the physical and economic presence and capital of specific companies and individuals.

The aforementioned sanctions may be imposed on entities and persons who will be included in the list maintained by the appropriate Minister in charge of internal affairs, responsible for making administrative decisions in this regard, based largely on the provisions of the Code of Administrative Proceedings. The proceedings in the matter of an entry may be undertaken by the Minister ex officio or at the request of one of the entities enumerated in the Act (e.g. the heads of the Central Anticorruption Bureau, the Internal Security Agency, the Foreign Intelligence Agency, the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Counterintelligence Service and the National Public Prosecutor). The list will be published in the Bulletin of Public Information on the Ministry’s website. It is therefore important that businesses keep their contractors, both current and future, under review for potential sanctions stipulated in the provisions of the Act.

Pursuant to the Art. 3 sec. 2 persons and entities who directly or indirectly support the Russian aggression against Ukraine or severely violate human rights, repress civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities pose another serious threat to democracy or the rule of law in the Russian Federation and Belarus may be included in the list. Entities may also be included on the list if they are directly related to previously listed entities, in particular through personal, organisational, economic or financial links.

It is also worth noting that the Minister in charge of internal affairs will be able to limit the scope of justification of the decision on entry and removal from the list for reasons of state security or public order in accordance with Art. 3 sec. 9 of the Act.  This provision is meant to ensure state security, e.g. in the dissemination of classified information.

Another important step provided for in the Act is to prohibit the import and transit of coal from Russia and Belarus through the territory of Poland. The entities trading in coal will have to document its origin and keep the relevant documents for 5 years.

The Act will also prohibit the use, application or promotion of symbols or names supporting the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (Art. 16 of the Act). The ban will apply, for example, to the ‘Z’ symbol used to mark the military vehicles of the aggressor’s army and, in recent weeks, also used by supporters of the policies of Russian President – Vladimir Putin. Violation of the ban is punishable by imprisonment of up to 2 years.

It is important to note that entities that fail to comply with their obligations under the Act with respect to, for example, freezing funds, funds or resources of persons identified on a list maintained by the Minister, violate the prohibition on the import and transit of coal, take action to circumvent the prohibitions or otherwise violate the prohibitions set out in the Act may be subject to financial liability. The fine for individual violations can be up to PLN 20 million.

In view of the current geopolitical situation, the introduction of the Act on special measures to prevent support for aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security is undoubtedly justified. Russia is not a reliable economic partner for Poland, and the measures provided for in the Act may restrict funding for arming activities of a state which does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbours and which, in the future, could potentially deploy its troops even against our country. It is worth noting that the value of Polish exports to Russia is around 36.6 billion PLN, while the value of imported goods is 77.8 billion PLN. This means that Russia is not, on an economy-wide basis, a key trading partner, although certainly in many industries the proposed measures could be very noticeable. It is therefore crucial to urgently secure other channels of trade. In view of the above arguments, it must be assumed that it is certainly more important to guarantee the security of the state and to cut off trade with Russia than to go through some temporary trade problems.

It should be pointed out, however, that the Act does not provide details on how traders should fulfil their obligations under the agreement in question, how they should behave towards listed entities under ongoing contracts. It is important for Polish companies to have information on the procedure for freezing funds, securing assets and potential liability for loss of value, damage or destruction.  Guidance in this regard seems necessary to avoid the potential risks involved in even unintentional breaches of the Act.

 

See: 12.04.2022 The stance of the ZPP on the Act of 7 April 2022, on special arrangements to prevent the promotion of aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security

Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) on the progress of work on the Digital Services Act

Warsaw, 15 April 2022

 

Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) on the progress of work
on the Digital Services Act

 

Digital Services Act (DSA) will soon amend the E-Commerce Directive that has been in place for more than 20 years. Work on the new regulation has been ongoing continuously since late 2020. The trilogue – a trilateral negotiation between key EU institutions – is expected to conclude early this month. However, we are now seeing the emergence of numerous proposals that were not included in the negotiators’ original mandate.

The disproportionality of the crisis response mechanism

Among the most recent proposals is the Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM), which was created to enable institutions to counter Russian disinformation attacks efficiently. We welcome that the EU institutions take decisive steps to fight against Russian propaganda. Nevertheless, we have some doubts as to whether introducing the proposed provisions in DSA at this stage of the negotiations is the best way to tackle this problem.

At the request of the French Presidency, the Commission has proposed introducing provisions that could force large technology companies to quickly adapt their platforms and increase the number of staff moderating content during major crises such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or war. The new DSA Article 25(a) would empower the Commission to require specific actions only based on a recommendation from a Council of European National Regulators. Paris has suggested that a two-thirds majority of regulators would be needed. Technology companies’ efforts to tackle disinformation or problems related to a specific crisis would be legally limited to three months. At the same time, the Commission would have to keep its decisions transparent.

This proposal has been protested against by 24 citizens’ organisations, who point out in their open letter that the European Commission should not be empowered to declare an EU-wide state of emergency unilaterally. Furthermore, these organisations note that the CRM is far from respecting international human rights standards of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality, and they call for reformulation.

Moreover, the new Article 25a of DSA is intended to empower national digital coordinators to require smaller platforms to comply with risk mitigation obligations that usually fall on very large platforms only. Such a provision appears to place a disproportionate burden on smaller platforms, whose ability to comply with the requirements mentioned above will be limited in practice, especially in the short term.

Ultimately, attempts to combat Russian disinformation may be undermined by other provisions found in DSA. Article 15(2) requires platforms to provide information on the facts and circumstances as well as the means used whenever content-related activities are undertaken. This will provide disinformation actors with full knowledge of how platforms combat disinformation and reduce the visibility of harmful content. As a result, in an effort to increase transparency, DSA will make it easier for bad actors to fool security systems and, consequently, more complex to fight disinformation. In the current situation, the EU institutions should create instruments that allow platforms to fight against disinformation actions carried out by third countries on a massive scale, rather than introducing new solutions to a horizontal regulation such as DSA at such a late stage.

Return of the ban on targeted advertising

In a plenary vote in the European Parliament, MEPs rejected a complete ban on targeted advertising. As a result, they voted to restrict the targeting of minors and targeting using sensitive data. We welcomed the EP decision. We believe it strikes the right balance between user protection and business rights. A total ban would have hit SMEs, depriving them of a cost-efficient way to reach their customers and severely limiting their growth opportunities. Therefore, we watch with concern the amendments tabled by MEPs aimed at achieving a de facto ban on targeted advertising.

Before discussing the EP’s latest proposals, it is first necessary to draw attention to the so-called ‘known minor problem’. Platforms would have to verify minors’ age to be able to restrict the use of targeted advertising. In the absence of general age verification on the Internet, platforms have to process user traffic data to determine age based on activity. Paradoxically, a ban on targeting could, in theory, lead to more tracking of children’s online activities.

To address this issue, the EP proposed an amendment to Article 24(1)(b), which states that ‘compliance with the obligation set out in the first subparagraph shall not entail the processing by online platforms of additional personal data on minors in order to verify the age of the recipient of the service’. Whilst we recognise the need to promote child safety through data minimisation, we believe that a provision worded in this way will be difficult to implement in practice and will reduce targeted advertising across all age groups. We propose that the provision be amended to prohibit excessive, rather than an additional, collection of personal data for age verification purposes.

Moreover, MEPs propose to extend the ban if the platform has doubts about whether the recipient is a minor (Article 24(1)(c)). This also means expanding the prohibition to the user when age verification is not possible. Given the current state of technology, such a provision could lead to a de facto ban on personalised advertising. This provision should be limited to cases where the platform has serious grounds, not just doubts, to believe that the recipient is a minor to avoid negotiators walking out their mandate. A provision worded in this way will simultaneously protect minors.

Extension of know-your-business-customer

As a final point, attention should be drawn to the proposal to extend the know-your-business-customer rule, which obliges Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to collect information that identifies business users in order to verify their identity. KYBC aims to improve online security by halting certain entities from using legitimate services to conduct illegal business anonymously. Assuming that the list of information required to be obtained from ISPs is proportionate and not an unreasonable administrative burden, the proposal should be viewed positively. However, during the January negotiation rounds, it was proposed to extend this principle to all types of ISPs, thus covering market places and social media, instant messaging, or streaming services.

In order to understand the implications of the KYBC extension, it is important to remember that DSA, like the E-Commerce Directive, is based on a prohibition of general internet monitoring. Such an injunction has been rejected from both the E-Commerce Directive and DSA, as it undermines fundamental values such as freedom of expression and could lead to censorship (i.e. excessive blocking or removal) of lawful content. Extending the KYBC to all intermediate service providers means extending it to all content that appears on the Internet. Therefore, it is hard to imagine in practice how the application of such a rule would take place without general monitoring of the Internet while still meeting DSA’s stringent requirements for human factors provision.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers actively participated in the work on the Act and, from the very beginning, called for solutions that would not overburden digital businesses. At the end of DSA negotiations, we maintain this call and urge policymakers not to place impossible demands on digitally active companies.

 

See more: 15.04.2022 Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) on the progress of work on the Digital Services Act

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