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Direct lines – key to the development of modern power industry

Warsaw, 7th March 2023

 

Direct lines – key to the development of modern power industry

 

  • Direct lines and cPPAs are key to a new energy reality in the EU
  • The draft act to implement Directive 2019/944 into the Polish legislation fails to guarantee the expected investment freedom in the area of direct lines
  • Hampering the development of RES installations powering industry will have implications for the entire national economy

One of the most significant regulations currently in development, of key importance to the Polish energy transformation, concerns the principles of operation of direct lines, that is the possibility of direct transmission of energy from the producer to the consumer. This aspect is particularly important for the undisturbed functioning of enterprises exporting their products to countries where it is already necessary to document that green energy was used for manufacturing purposes. The supply of energy from RES, or rather the lack thereof, may therefore become a fundamental problem for the further functioning of enterprises.

In accordance with the definition contained in Art. 3 sec. 11 (f) of the Polish Energy Law: “direct line – a power line connecting an isolated generation site directly with a customer or a power line connecting an generation site of an energy company with installations belonging to that company or installations belonging to its subsidiaries”. This translates into an entrepreneur’s own investment or a partnership with a RES producer. This instrument is crucial for the development of the cPPA/vPPA sector, that is long-term B2B contracts for the purchase of green energy.

The currently processed amendment to the Energy Law and the Act on Renewable Energy Sources (UC74), which is planned to be adopted by the Council of Ministers in the first quarter of 2023, aims to implement into the Polish legal system, among others, the Directive 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity. It also covers the issue of direct lines.

As the legislators themselves have noted, current practices of the market regulator and the courts indicate that the provisions regarding direct lines, in their current wording, are insufficient to achieve the objectives provided for in Directive 2019/944. Thus far, the main problem has come down to the narrow interpretation of the direct line as an installation operating in an island system. For this reason, obtaining a permit for the construction of a direct line has so far only been possible, as a rule, when it was impossible to connect the recipient to the power grid. Meanwhile, direct lines should, on the one hand, be a substitute for the distribution network, and on the other hand, it is only when the coexistence of these two types of connections on a customer’s end (network and via a direct line) is enabled that the act has a chance to positively influence the development of the market in this area.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers is of the opinion that this is an extremely important issue for the economic development of our country, due to the fact that, in the future, direct lines will become a fundamental element of market rules in energy trading. It is regrettable that this issue is one of several included in the UC74 draft act that negatively affect not only the clarity of legal provisions, but also the pace of their processing. A separate act would therefore be a preferred solution. All the more so, since any regulations concerning the development of distributed energy in Poland should in the future take into account the new rules regarding the operation of direct lines. It is, however, certainly good news for entrepreneurs that work on these regulations is still in progress.

One ought to clearly state in this place that direct lines will not be a threat to the national energy system or to the functioning of the traditional power industry, because due to their capacity, they will serve an entirely different segment of the economy. At the same time, they will in the future significantly improve the functioning of medium- and low-voltage lines, which in turn will have a positive impact on the operation of the power system as a whole.

The overarching objective of direct lines should become the key incentive for lawmakers with regard to this type of lines: direct supply of energy to industry as well as local, medium-sized enterprises, mainly manufacturing companies, which require cheap, green energy to develop.

The present model of network operation is incompatible with the provisions on direct lines contained in Directive 2019/944, which obliges member states, among others, to undertake all necessary measures to enable all producers and electricity supply undertakings operating in individual countries to supply their own premises and customers through direct lines, without being subject to disproportionate administrative procedures or costs.

The currently proposed version of the UC74 draft act obliges the recipient to include the trading company even if the producer of electricity and the recipient thereof are the same entity and they only partially use the power line. Such an approach on the part of the legislator will have a significant impact on the prices of electricity supplied through direct lines.

And reducing the cost of energy supply is the main objective of direct lines, especially for large consumers, energy-intensive entities in particular.

Then again, the regulations regarding the need to enter direct lines for production units with a capacity of more than 2 MW to a registry kept by the Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki) significantly limit the possibility of free investments. This in turn will slow down the investment processes related to generation of distributed energy. It will also significantly limit the use of direct contracts between the producer and the recipient (cPPA/vPPA).

The proposed shape of the regulation is unacceptable, as it limits the possibility of increasing supply of green energy to the industry, which may in the end hamper the development of the entire economy.

The form of the so-called solidarity fee (a surcharge to be paid by recipients connected to the power grid in spite of the fact that most of their energy supplies will be sent through direct lines) also changed in the latest proposal of the regulations. The introduction of the solidarity fee is in its essence understandable, because the operator is legally obliged to bear the maintenance costs of the energy network to which the recipients are connected, despite the decreasing supply of energy through these lines. However, according to the draft, the fee is to be related to the amount of energy transmitted through a direct line and will be paid to the trading company. In the opinion of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, the fee payment mechanism should be covered by a transitional period and fully regulated later in the future, when both producers and consumers already have more experience in this new energy trading model at the local level, based on direct lines.

The number of rejected motions to connect new RES installations to the distribution and supply network is constantly growing, which impedes the development of investments and threatens the Polish economy. Investment opportunities in direct lines are supposed to remedy such barriers and the emphasis here should be on expanding the rights of producers and recipients followed by reducing administrative costs and obligations.

One ought to keep in mind the determination of the European Commission in establishing a common energy market, where direct lines and cPPAs are key elements in creating a new energy reality. A reality based on a different business model in the power industry than before, where relations between producers and recipients are not burdened with unjustified additional costs.

It might be worth considering how such a new business model is going to affect the competitiveness of the economies of countries that will actively participate in it.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers calls for the abolition of all legislative restrictions on investment processes related to the construction of direct lines.

 

See more: 07.03.2023 Direct lines – key to the development of the modern power industry

Barriers to running a business in Poland – a constant, unchanging problem

Warsaw, 13th March 2023

 

Barriers to running a business in Poland – a constant, unchanging problem

 

High taxes, legal instability, and high labour costs have been the “TOP 3” barriers to doing business according to Polish entrepreneurs since 2019. Legal instability has since then become a much more severe barrier (36% of respondents in 2019, and 51% in 2023), and entrepreneurs in Poland similarly perceive barriers to the development of business activity. Ambiguous, overcomplicated, and unfavourable provisions of the law as well as extensive administrative procedures certainly make the “TOP 3”.

“The instability of the law as a whole is a major problem, but what is even more important is the complexity of economic and tax law. For seven out of ten entrepreneurs from the trade sector, this constitutes a serious barrier to running a business,” said Cezary Kaźmierczak, President of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers.

According to Polish entrepreneurs, the chief reason SMEs do not employ more people is the excessive cost associated with it. Since 2019, more than 60% of Polish entrepreneurs regardless of their sector have been of this opinion. Whereas when it comes to the main obstacles to investing capital by SMEs, Polish entrepreneurs claim the following: insufficient profits – 46% of respondents, fear of capital loss – 45%, and declining demand for services and/or products provided by the company – 41%.

“These results are confirmed by the findings of our latest Busometr survey for 1Q23. The vast majority of entrepreneurs said they were reluctant to invest and found employment costs problematic,” continued Kaźmierczak.

As many as 51% of Polish entrepreneurs said the largest barrier to starting a business in Poland was the lack of free funds to begin with, 46% of them were reluctant to take responsibility for the possible failure of their company (38% in 2019), and 36% had no vision for their business operations (46% in 2020).

According to 55% of respondents, non-refundable financial aid would be one of the best incentives to start one’s own business offered by the state along with an extended period of preferential social security (54%). Entrepreneurs also answered “lowering social security contributions or other taxes” to the question about “other” driving forces that would encourage them to start their own business.

“This proves Polish entrepreneurs support our actions and demands related to, for instance, the memorandum on the package for small businesses, which included an extended period of preferential social security or reduced disability pension contribution paid by micro-enterprises. What I find most pessimistic in this study is that basically nothing has changed in years,” he concluded.

 

METHODOLOGY

In January 2023, the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers together with Maison Research House conducted a survey entitled “Barriers to running a business in Poland”. It is a cyclical survey conducted since 2019, using the CAWI technique with a sample of 534 companies from the SME sector.

 

See more: 13.03.2023 Barriers of performing business activity in Poland

Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers: in light of the dramatic increase in operating costs, we need a set of laws for micro-enterprises

Warsaw, 9th February 2023

 

Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers:
in light of the dramatic increase in operating costs, we need a set of laws for micro-enterprises

 

Overview:

  • Polish entrepreneurs have been struggling with numerous crises and skyrocketing operating costs since 2020. This impacts directly their financial situation. In 1Q 2022, 161 thousand companies suspended business activity, while 104.3 thousand shut it down.
  • This year, Polish companies await further increases in energy prices and other operating costs, as well as a further, second in a row, minimum wage increase.
  • The smallest companies run by micro-entrepreneurs have found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. If we want to avoid a wave of bankruptcies, we need a package of solutions to improve the financial situation of micro-enterprises.
  • The problem of flat-rate social security premiums excessively burdening the smallest of companies can be solved by eliminating the time restrictions on the so -called “little ZUS plus”. Indexation of the income threshold entitling to take advantage of preferential conditions should also be taken into consideration (presently it amounts to PLN 120,000).
  • In order to reduce non-wage labour costs for micro-enterprises, we suggest exempting them from the obligation to pay premiums to the Labour Fund, as well as a reduction by half of the amount of pension premiums paid by micro-enterprises for their employees.
  • Further changes in the regulations introduced with the “Polish Deal” ought to be considered. We suggest the health premium micro-enterprises be reduced from 9% to 6%, while the limits and amounts of deductible contributions from income in the case of taxpayers settling with flat tax and a lump sum on registered revenues be increased.
  • We also suggest that in the case of employees employed by micro-enterprises, the sick leave be paid from the first day the employee’s inability to work.

Introduction – a hard time for Polish companies

Recent years have not been easy for Polish entrepreneurs, the smallest companies of the SME sector in particular. The COVID-19 pandemic was first to pose a serious threat, along with the restrictions that followed. It led to numerous enterprises being shut down, while those that survived oftentimes struggled with financial liquidity. The situation was further aggravated with the largest tax law amendment in years: the new Polish Deal. The provisions therein were ill-considered and harmful, and thus led to immense chaos among entrepreneurs, accountants, and the tax authorities alike. Despite the fact they were largely improved over the fiscal year, 1Q 2022 was a period of high uncertainty for Polish businesses, and even now plenty of tax norms raise questions – and for good reason. Moreover, 2022 was a time of skyrocketing gas, electricity, and fuel prices. In many cases, there were multiple increases for entrepreneurs. This, of course, was associated with considerable inflation, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war was also meant disrupted supply chains (a problem already since the pandemic). The inflationary spiral also translated into an increase in wages, and thus in 2023 we are dealing with a record-high increase in minimum wages and social security premiums for entrepreneurs. All this converts into a substantial increase in operating costs. Recent years have undoubtedly been extremely difficult for Polish entrepreneurs, for SMEs in particular.

Statistics reflect the problems signalled above. The Ministry of Development and Technology stated that 161 thousand companies suspended business activity in 1Q 2022, whereas 104.3 thousand shut it down (nearly 29% more than in the same period in 2021). Furthermore, as many as 69% of entrepreneurs believe that the conditions for doing business deteriorated in 1Q 2022 [1]. The data also indicate a highly disturbing fact: presently close to one in seven companies, one in six among micro-enterprises, have suspended operations[2]. Many companies will never return to the market and will be removed “ex officio” from the registry of CEIDG (the Polish Central Registration and Information on Business).

Other data suggest that from the beginning of January 2022 until the end of October last year, CEIDG received 157.7 thousand motions to terminate sole proprietorship – 17.1% more than in the same period in 2021[3]. At the same time, CEIDG received 278.1 thousand motions to suspend sole proprietorship – 31.1% more than in the same period a year before[4]. Polish companies are ever more often forced to shut down operations and urgently need help, not through direct subsidies, but systemic changes that will help reduce the costs incurred by the smallest entities operating on the market.

An aid package for the Polish SME sector

  1. “Relief to start” & “Small ZUS”

Among benefits for new enterprises, there are three of major importance: “Relief to start”, “Small ZUS” and “Small ZUS+”. New entrepreneurs (or resuming operations after 60 calendar months from their last suspension or shutdown) can benefit from a relief for starting the company for 6 full calendar months. During this period, they do not pay social security contributions (however, they still have to pay health insurance).

The second solution is called “Small ZUS”. It allows new entrepreneurs in a full period of 24 months from starting their business or making use of the “Relief to start” to pay social security contributions in a preferential amount. By default, contributions are paid from a declared base not lower than 60% of the forecast average gross salary, whereas in the case of “Small ZUS”, the basis may be an amount not lower than 30% of the minimum remuneration. The amount of the premium for individual insurance is an appropriate percentage of the declared basis, for instance: pension insurance in the case of “Small ZUS” in the lowest amount will amount to 19.52% multiplied by 30% of the minimum wage.

It is possible to make use of preferential ZUS contributions as part of the “Small ZUS+” programme aimed at companies that obtained revenues maximum PLN 120,000 the year before. They can make use of the same benefits as in the case of “Small ZUS” for a maximum of 36 months in the next 60 calendar months of conducting business activity. Importantly, the time of using the small ZUS is also included in this period. Therefore, in most cases, this program allows you to extend the small ZUS by an additional year.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposes to eliminate time restrictions for the possibility of taking advantage of the “Small ZUS” programme.

JUSTIFICATION

The “Small ZUS” programme helps new companies in their initial period of operations, when most of them try to scale up, build a customer base and capital necessary for further functioning. This is a very beneficial solution that facilitates difficult beginnings. Nevertheless, there is a very large group of companies on the market that even at a later stage do not get high revenues. These are usually sole proprietorships, craftsmen or small commercial companies. Many of these people value independence and do not want to work “full-time”. They are devoted to their passions, making them their profession. Moreover, many companies that usually obtain higher revenue have temporary financial difficulties, caused, for example, by a decrease in the number of projects. Unfortunately, these entities can only benefit from preferential conditions for a limited time according to the rules of “Small ZUS” and “Small ZUS+”. When they have to start paying insurance contributions in full, it often turns out to be impossible, because after paying fees and taxes from the revenues obtained, only a small amount remains, which does not allow them to support themselves and their families.

This problem has become particularly evident in recent years. Initially, the COVID-19 pandemic was a considerable blow in a major way to the smallest entrepreneurs, who had no sufficient capital to survive trying times, let alone pay public levies and taxes. The previous year, on the other hand, was characterised by inflation and massive increases in operating costs in the form of prices of gas and electricity or rental costs to name a few. In 2023, there has also been a record increase in social security premiums, which are, after all, related to average salaries and wages. Therefore, in order to enable economic activity also for these entities, we propose that the “Small ZUS” programme have no time constrictions. We postulate that entrepreneurs ought to be able to decide each month whether they can afford to pay premiums only from the base amounting to 30% of the minimum wage, or whether they can afford to pay a higher contribution.

  1. Reduction of the disability pension paid by micro-enterprises

One of the social insurances that is a heavy burden for employers is disability insurance. The premium amounts to a total of 8% of the base and is paid by employees in the amount of 1.5% and by employers in the amount of as much as 6.5%.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposes to reduce the disability pension premium paid by micro-entrepreneurs for themselves and for their employees by half (to the level of 3.25%). The other half of this premium could be reimbursed from public funds.

JUSTIFICATION

Employers pay 6.5% of the disability pension premium on behalf of their employees. For the smallest companies, this is a very large amount, which considerably increases labour costs. Considering the amount of the minimum salary in February 2023, a monthly premium per single employee amounts to approx. PLN 225. In the case of the average salary in the enterprise sector in December 2022 (PLN 7,329.96), the disability pension premium paid by entrepreneurs for their employees comes up to as much as PLN 475. Lowering the disability pension premium will significantly reduce employment costs. Especially since in the case of even the lowest salary, which currently amounts to PLN 3,490, the employee receives a net amount slightly above PLN 2,700, while the employer’s total cost exceeds PLN 4,200. Therefore, in the case of even the minimum wage, the state receives approx. PLN 1,500 per month in the form of various premiums and taxes.

  1. Premiums to the Labour Fund and the Solidarity Fund

In recent years, operating costs have been growing drastically. In 2023, entrepreneurs’ social security contributions increased at a record-breaking level, payments for utilities, such as gas and electricity, are rising as well, as are rental costs. Both the minimum and the average wage are on the rise. All this translates into ever larger difficulties with maintaining financial liquidity by the smallest entities. A solution partially mitigating the increase in costs may be to waive the collection of premiums to the Labour Fund and the Solidarity Fund from micro-enterprises.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposes to abolish the obligation to contribute to the Labour Fund and the Solidarity Fund for micro-enterprises.

JUSTIFICATION

Operating costs, which are growing year-to-year, make it impossible for many of the smallest enterprises to stay on the market. Others require capital so that they can carry out further investments and consequently develop. Relieving entrepreneurs of costs related to premiums to the Labour Fund and the Solidarity Fund will allow the smallest companies to develop and, as a result, will stimulate the Polish economy. We emphasise that this proposal of ours applies solely to the smallest micro-enterprises. This solution is therefore designed with the most vulnerable entities in our economy in mind. One should also stress that contributions to the aforementioned funds are paid only by entrepreneurs, and not the employees.

  1. Lowering the health insurance premium for the self-employed and micro-enterprises

One of the most controversial changes introduced in the Polish Deal regarded health insurance regulations. The new solutions do not allow companies to deduct health insurance premiums according to the same rules as in 2021. Therefore, a significant part of the benefits resulting from the introduction of a higher tax-free amount or the increased tax threshold is squandered.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposes that in the case of micro-enterprises and people who are self-employed, the health insurance premium be reduced from 9% to 6% if using tax scale. We also propose to increase the limit of reducing the tax base in the registered lump sum to 75% and to increase the amount that can be deducted from the tax base (income) to PLN 14,000 of the value of paid health insurance premiums in the case of flat-rate tax.

JUSTIFICATION

Costs related to health insurance for the self-employed and the smallest enterprises constitute often a rather large part of their budgets. During times of very high inflation and operating costs going up, it seems reasonable to enable the smallest entrepreneurs to reduce these costs.

  1. A change in the rules for paying sickness benefits

Employees who are unable to work are entitled for the first 33 days to a so-called “sick pay” paid by their employers. It is only from the 34th day onwards that “sickness benefits” are covered by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposes that from the very first day of inability to work, people employed in a micro-enterprise be entitled to sickness benefits.

JUSTIFICATION

Since the vast majority of employees’ absence from work takes place due to illnesses that last less than 33 days, the costs of sickness benefits are mostly charged to entrepreneurs, and not the Social Insurance Institution. This is despite the fact that employees pay appropriate sickness insurance amounting to as much as 2.45% of the contribution assessment base. Many of them will never take advantage of sickness benefits throughout their professional careers, but only of sick pay.

Summary

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers presents these proposals in the hope of starting a broad public debate on the current social and health insurance system, which inhibits entrepreneurship and impacts the smallest companies on our market. The economic situation of our country, which has been struggling with constant crises over the past three years, significantly affects the SME sector, micro-enterprises in particular. Countless statistical data confirm this argument indicating that growing numbers of entrepreneurs are forced to suspend or shut down business operations. The total cost of implementing all the postulates listed in this document is estimated at approx. PLN 20-25 billion annually. This would be real help for the smallest companies in Poland. We fear that the lack of decisive action may result in streets full of empty shop windows and abandoned premises, and thus a serious crisis in Polish micro-entrepreneurship.

***

[1] https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/firmy-zwijaja-zagiel-dramatyczne-dane-6835208485485248a.html (accessed on 1st February 2023)

[2] https://forsal.pl/biznes/firma/artykuly/8641001,jednoosobowa-dzialalnosc-gospodarcza-koszty-prowadzenia-w-polsce-raport.html (accessed on 1st February 2023)

[3] https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/kryzys-uderzyl-w-male-firmy-masowo-sie-zamykaja-z-miesiaca-na-miesiac-jest-gorzej-6850203369155392a.html (accessed on 1st February 2023)

[4] https://www.infor.pl/prawo/gmina/dzialalnosc-gospodarcza/5638794,jednoosobowe-firmy-likwidacja-2022-prognozy-2023.html (accessed on 1st February 2023)

 

See more: 09.02.2023 Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers in light of the dramatic increase in operating costs, we need a set of laws for micro-enterprises

Appeal of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers to Senators of the Republic of Poland with regard to the “10H Act”

Warsaw, 14th February 2023

 

Appeal of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers to Senators of the Republic of Poland
with regard to the “10H Act”

 

Considering the high demand for green energy in Poland, the Union believes that any and all decisions limiting the development of RES constitute a squandered opportunity for our country for numerous new investments, jobs, and a competitive advantage in the CEE region.

The change of wording in the amendment to the act on investments in wind farms and some other acts of the minimum distance of wind farms from buildings from 500 to 700 metres considerably limits the potential of onshore wind energy in the decade to come.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers closely monitors the legislative process with regard to the amendment of the act on investments in wind farms, which is intended to restore investment opportunities in this field. Time and again, we have indicated the rising green energy deficit in Poland, threatening the functioning of companies exporting their products to EU markets. Onshore wind farms are nowadays the cheapest source of electricity, as well as an investment-effective source of green energy. In our view, the several years long delay in amending the act that would allow for renewed investments in onshore wind energy in Poland to be highly unfavourable for the entire Polish economy.

As part of the first reading of the draft amendment, during a joint meeting of the Sejm Committee for Energy, Climate and State Assets and the Sejm Committee for Local Government and Regional Policy, a significant change was introduced to it, aimed at increasing the minimum distance at which a wind farm may be located in relation to the residential development from 500 to 700 metres.

One ought to emphasise that the presented draft is a long-awaited legislative initiative, and the solutions included in it are the result of many years of cooperation and consultations with the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, among them representatives of local governments, NGOs, the manufacturing sector, representatives industry, local communities etc. The solutions developed in the course of said legislative process lasting almost two years constitute a broad compromise, optimally reconciling the interests of various parties.

Ensuring green energy availability in the years to come will directly determine how competitive Polish economy is going to, while being a condition for future investments in Poland.

A large part of enterprises running their operations in Poland export their products, among others, to European markets. In the case of the furniture and automotive industries, it is approx. 80%. It is expected that all exports, including from the above-mentioned sectors, will have to be produced using low-carbon energy sources by 2026. Considering the current industrial consumption of electricity by the industry at the level of approx. 55 TWh annually, it will be necessary to provide 35-40 TWh of green energy a year for export needs. This, owing to investment opportunities and time required to develop manufacturing projects, can only be executed through the development of onshore wind energy and large-scale photovoltaic installations.

Increasing the distance from 500 to 700 metres also negatively impacts the functioning of communes themselves, limiting their ability to build residential facilities in the vicinity of existing wind farms. Hampering the development of wind energy also means limiting revenue streams for municipalities from property tax or other public levies related to investments carried out in the area of onshore wind farms. Local communities are also among the first potential groups to benefit from lower energy prices.

The above conditions were remarked on by the draft’s initiators as part of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (hereinafter referred to as “RIA”), wherein numerous benefits resulting from the entry into force of the new regulations were elaborated on in detail, such as:

  • significant impact on the finances of enterprises in the following sectors: construction, consulting, and design (revenues of enterprises, according to the RIA, would amount to PLN 12.5-20.9 billion), new jobs (the removal of the above-mentioned administrative barriers would allow for development of onshore wind energy to 22-24 GW by 2040 with up to 42,000 jobs may be created related to the sector),
  • additional revenues from property tax (in a cautious scenario, communes where wind farms will be located may obtain a total of over PLN 670 million from property tax alone, while in an optimistic scenario this amount may exceed PLN 1.1 billion),
  • lower electricity prices on the wholesale market (in a scenario assuming a total installed capacity in Poland at the level of approx. 22 GW, total annual savings in energy costs may amount up to PLN 22 billion),
  • providing cheap, zero-emission energy to energy-intensive companies (from the perspective of large enterprises, onshore wind energy in particular shows potential for development in direct long-term corporate power purchase agreements from RES (known as cPPAs), indicated, among others, in the Polish Energy Policy 2040, concluded directly between RES suppliers and recipients of large amounts of energy)[1].

In the RIA, it was clearly emphasised that positive effects of regulatory changes elaborated on in detail in this document were based on specific parameters contained in the draft act. The most important of them is the mechanism for determining the minimum distance from residential buildings for locating onshore wind farms. Any and all modifications to this mechanism, in particular affecting its essential parameter, which is the permissible minimum distance, will considerably impact the effects of said regulations and thus make the benefits referred to in the RIA unattainable.

The change in question, that is, a minimum distance of 700 instead of 500 metres, will significantly reduce the generation potential of the RES sector. Considering the high productivity and cost-effectiveness of energy generation, as well as the relatively short period required to execute projects, it is the optimal answer to the energy crisis and is of fundamental importance from the point of view of industry operating in Poland.

From the analyses of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers and many industry organisations, it is clear that in the case of planned projects in areas with the type of residential development that is dominant in Poland, increasing the minimum distance to 700 metres will lead to a reduction in the original assumptions regarding the number of turbines and thus the installed capacity of projects, ranging from 60 to 85%. As a consequence, the vast majority of new wind projects will not be built at all or will be greatly reduced.

One should also note that the change increasing the distance from wind turbines from 500 to 700 metres will significantly limit the investment potential in rural areas.

Considering the data presented in the RIA, limiting the development potential of the onshore wind energy sector will clearly be unfavourable for local governments, entities in the supply chain for the sector, the construction industry, and the Polish energy-intensive industry, which, due to the limited availability of cheap zero-emission energy, is already facing the need to reduce employment.

Regardless of the above, it must be emphasised that this change, apart from the obvious reduction of the benefits described above, will also be negatively perceived by locally communities living in areas where investments in the field of wind farms are being planned.

It should also be stressed that the change in question stands in clear contradiction to the main goal of liberalising the rules for wind farm location, in process since mid-2021, which from the very beginning was to ensure the greatest possible authority of local governments and communities in the planning process, in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity of power. Increasing the minimum distance significantly reduces the possibility of real influence of local communities on this process, imposing a rigidly defined framework for the development of the onshore wind energy sector.

With all the above in mind, we appeal to the Senators of the Republic of Poland to introduce provisions aimed at restoring the original assumptions of the project, that is, the possibility of locating wind turbines no less than 500 metres from residential buildings in order to avoid a number of the described negative effects resulting from undermining the compromise developed in a long-term process, carried out among a wide group of stakeholders. One must stress that the mentioned minimum distance of 500 metres was recommended in the 2022 report by the Environmental Engineering Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences “Wind power plants in the human environment”, co-authored by 37 scientists, members of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As part of their work, thorough field measurements of the impact of wind farms on the environment were carried out.

***

[1] All and all data provided in this paragraph are obtained from the Regulatory Impact Assessment presented in the Sejm Paper No. 2938

 

See more: 14.02.2023 Appeal of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers to Senators of the Republic of Poland with regard to the “10H Act”

Opinion of the Chief Economist of ZPP – summary of 2022 and prospects for 2023

Warsaw, 7 February 2023

 

Opinion of the Chief Economist of ZPP – summary of 2022 and prospects for 2023

 

The year 2022 could be called interesting, in the sense in which the Chinese use the curse “may you live in interesting times”.  The beginning of the year brought concerns about inflation (although even pessimists predicted a peak in consumer inflation of approximately 10% year-on-year).  It was supposed to be influenced by the rising prices of energy raw materials and the rebound in the Polish and global economies after the pandemic.  This rebound started in 2021, but many forecasts, especially those from 2021, indicated its continuation in the following months. This, in turn, was expected to affect prices.

Even before the aggression against Ukraine, Russia began to apply a policy of a limited supply of energy resources to Europe. This was possible due to the dependence of European countries on Russian gas (supplied via pipelines, which meant that there were not many stimuli to change the supplier; in fact, Europe’s dependence on Russian gas has been deepening, not weakening, as a result of German policy in recent decades), oil ( flowing through the Przyjaźń oil pipeline – again, there is no cheaper and easier form of import, hence Central European countries, in particular, were dependent on Russian supplies) and its distillates (especially diesel oil was imported to Europe in significant quantities). The beginning of the year also brought the last significant wave of COVID, during which the government still tried to apply restrictions limiting mobility. 

At the same time, hopes for the sustainability of a post-COVID economic rebound in the conditions of logistical issues (due to COVID, or rather anti-COVID policies) made us think with concern about the length of the aforementioned inflation impulse.  It was supposed to be caused primarily by excessive demand in relation to the production capacity of companies struggling with rising costs and supply disruptions.  Optimists; however, expected another year of stable economic growth and a slowdown in inflation after the expiry of the pandemic state aid.

The Winter Olympics in Beijing, which took place in February, were supposed to be a symbol of the success of China’s “zero COVID” policy and the effectiveness and agility of Chinese foreign policy.  The Olympics venues were often closed to spectators, who were few in number anyway – foreigners had virtually no chance to enter China for health and hygiene reasons.  Despite this, the following months showed that the Chinese pandemic was an even greater failure than the European one. Subsequent lockdowns slowed down the recovery of the economy, and the end of the year brought a relaxation of that policy (probably due to the economic situation and growing internal unrest) and a rapidly growing wave of the pandemic. Its scale is difficult to assess due to the censorship of information by the Chinese authorities. China’s efforts to organise the Olympics in times of peace were only partially successful – it may have postponed the date of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – but only by 2 or 3 weeks … The year of the Chinese Olympics will not be remembered as a year of peace, at least in the West.  However, China and its policy must be remembered because, as it turned out at the end of the year, the Chinese accidentally threw a life belt to Europe in the middle of an energy crisis.

And this crisis began at the turn of February and March, when, as a result of Russia’s invasion on Ukraine, the EU launched a policy of sanctions limiting imports of energy resources. A similar policy of limiting exports by Russia became an offset to the above. Later on, the size of future supplies was affected by the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline: since it was temporarily closed anyway, its impact was negligible; however, it called into question the possibility of a rapid return to a business-as-usual policy with Russia.  The concerns about supplying Europe with energy resources, which are crucial especially in winter (when RES efficiency is often negligible), led to an increase in the prices of natural gas and oil on regional and global markets. This, in turn, translated into an increase in the prices of fuel and energy – one of the two drivers of inflation, which turned out to be much higher than anyone had expected, not only in Poland but almost everywhere in Europe and, more broadly, in the world. Europe’s energy problems; however, were largely resolved thanks to the supplies of liquefied natural gas. At the end of the year, it turned out that the increase in those supplies was made possible mainly by the collapse in demand in China. There were two reasons for that collapse – the aforementioned policy of shutting down the economy and, to some extent, the increase in supplies from Russia (which was trying to find buyers for its hydrocarbons).  In 2022, the driver of inflation was also the fiscal policy of the previous years. Thee successive measures to support citizens and businesses resulted in an increase in debt in European countries and also in excessive money issuance.

The increase in energy prices in Europe affected the condition of some manufacturing industries, especially energy-intensive ones,  e.g.,  BASF moved most of its chemical production from Europe to the USA. It also affected the situation of households, which had to and still have to face a sharp increase in energy and fuel prices. On top of that, rising prices fueled inflation and, consequently, consumer prices in Europe are 15-25% higher than two years ago.

The following months brought an increase in tension in Ukraine: the Russian offensive, which collapsed, Ukraine’s counter-offensive in the autumn, and finally, the new tactics of Russian attacks on civilian critical infrastructure facilities. It was not until late autumn that the situation stabilised. It is worth mentioning that the assistance of NATO countries played a key role in terms of Ukraine’s combat capability and ability to wage the war against Russia.  Poland remained one of the leaders of that assistance throughout the year.

The war also triggered a massive wave of emigration from Ukraine, which I have already written about. Approximately 1.5 million new emigrants from Ukraine stayed in Poland, either for a shorter or longer period of time.  Some of them decided to bind their fate to the Republic for a while, taking up work here, setting up businesses and sending their children to school.  This is almost 1 million people who still remain in Poland, have valid PESELs, and will potentially rejuvenate the population and replenish the labour force.

At the same time, after the summer price rallies, fuel and energy prices stabilised. With storage facilities full and supplies secured, prices began to fall back to the pre-war levels towards the end of the year.  The falling prices further fueled growing fears of a recession, possibly global in scope.  Especially since strained supply chains, risks related to the uncertainty associated with the course of the conflict and the carelessness of economic policies during the COVID period are also conducive to that.

Inflation triggered a response from other central banks; therefore, a cycle of solid increases in interest rates, not seen for a long time, was noticeable both globally and in Poland this year – the time of zero cost of capital is over, at least for now.  This, in turn, began to translate into the cost of servicing debts, private ones – such as housing loans in Poland – and public ones.  In the autumn, the increase in UK bond yields (meaning a drop in market valuation) threatened the stability of the market and the UK pension system so much that it prompted a multi-billion dollar liquidity intervention by the Bank of England. During the same period, the Polish government refrained from issuing PLN bonds due to the compensation expected by the market for borrowing capital. It was replaced by issuing dollar-denominated debt – much cheaper but exposed to currency market turbulence.

And those turbulences were serious.  On the main EUR-USD currency pair, annual volatility reached several dozen per cent. EUR fell 20% against USD in the period from January to September, and then strengthened by 10%.  The volatility of peripheral currencies, such as PLN, was even greater.  This volatility, as many times before, protected Polish exporters but, at the same time, had a negative impact on energy prices and the situation of not only importers but also foreign currency borrowers.

At the end of the year, the situation in the world and in Poland became stable.  However, the last 12 months led to a deterioration of the situation of Polish entrepreneurs (inflation, the wage-price spiral and especially rising energy prices played a key role here) and even more serious problems for consumers. For the first time in a very long time, real wages fell due to inflation, while the cost of living skyrocketed.  The reduction in consumption (also evident through the fall in lending) is more and more painfully felt by entrepreneurs. One can only hope that the worst is over, although this is not certain.

With regard to Polish politics, which is worth mentioning at the end, the most important issue in the field of economy, apart from disputes over inflation and interest rates, was the matter of the National Recovery Plan – the EU funds allocated for the post-COVID recovery of the economy, the transfer of which the European Commission made conditional on the Polish government achieving a number of milestones.

The year 2022 was so interesting that it remains only to wish that the upcoming 11 months of 2023 will be at least as peaceful as January.



Dr hab. Piotr Koryś
Chief Economist of ZPP

 

See: 07.02.2023 Opinion of the Chief Economist of ZPP – summary of 2022 and prospects for 2023

Slightly better business sentiment – The Busometer ZPP for the first half of 2023

Warsaw, 9 February 2023 

 

SLIGHTLY BETTER BUSINESS SENTIMENT
 The Busometer ZPP for the first half of 2023

 

Business sentiment for the next six months has improved slightly; however, it remains significantly pessimistic. The overall value of the BUSOMETER sentiment index in companies was 36.4, while the index was 32.4 in the previous research period.

As Cezary Kaźmierczak, the President of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, noticed: “Entrepreneurs are reacting cautiously to the signals coming from the market.” So far, the gloomy scenarios forecasted last year have not materialised; however, there are still no clear signs of recovery.  The result is a more optimistic mood, compared to that from the last few readings; however, it is still far from enthusiasm.”

As it was the case in the second quarter of 2022,  entrepreneurs positively assess the situation on the labour market (currently 53.1 compared to the previous 51.6).

“This confirms that the labour market in Poland is in a stable and good condition at the moment – there is low unemployment and employers are unlikely to consider downsizing” – noticed Cezary Kaźmierczak commenting on the results of the study.

The value of the sentiment index in the context of the economic situation increased quite significantly (from 27.9 to 35.1). The index can still be described as a “crisis”; however, its increase shows that some entities see prospects of an economic rebound on the horizon in the perspective of the next six months. However, the fact that as many as 58% of entrepreneurs believe that the economic situation will deteriorate further in the coming months cannot be ignored.

The only component of the index that has not increased from the previous study is the investor sentiment index (it is 24.1, as it was six months ago).

As the ZPP President clearly noticed: “There is a certain risk that we will be stuck in persistent and long-term inflation, which will prolong the period of slowdown, and the lack of prospects for recovery from that phase will block investment attempts in the corporate sector.”

METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY

The Busometer ZPP – the SME Economic Sentiment Index, is an indicator showing the degree of optimism of small and medium-sized enterprises and their planned activities in the perspective of the next six months. The Busometer has been published by the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers in cooperation with Maison Research House every six mothn since 2011.

The Busometer Index value is influenced by three components:

  • the economic situation,
  • the labour market (remuneration and employment),
  • investment. 

The value of each component ranges from 0 to 100.  The Busometer scores below 50  indicate pessimistic business sentiment, while scores above 50 indicate optimism.


See:
9.02.2023 Busometr: Prognosis for the first half of 2023

 

Summary of 2022 in the energy industry as a year of changes and challenges

Warsaw, 20 January 2023

 

Summary of 2022 in the energy industry as a year of changes and challenges

 

  • Although the energy crisis did not bring the predicted catastrophe to Europe, it did lead to a significant turnaround in resource and raw material policies.
  • Accelerating distributed energy development in the EU today is a race against time and other markets – a race for stable and lower energy prices on the Old Continent.
  • In the face of new challenges, the energy transition all the more needs to be implemented in a smooth, rational and economically efficient manner.

With Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the old order to which the European continent had been accustomed to for more than 20 years, was gone. Until that day, fluctuations in energy commodity prices were stabilized by the steady supply from Russia. As it turned out, however – and this had already been noted by Polish policymakers, among others – Russia’s raw materials policy not only pursued economic goals, but also served as an effective weapon in the struggle against the more broadly defined Western world. Last year was thus a sad lesson on the consequences of years of naiveté in assessing the Kremlin’s intentions. Despite everything, however, we entered 2023 as a winning continent. Thanks to widespread mobilization in the face of the energy crisis, for the time being we have avoided a wave of blackouts in Europe. And while it is possible that without the support of mother nature (high temperatures + wind), the image would be less optimistic – it should also be acknowledged that so far, the darkest scenarios have not come true.

At the same time, there is no doubt that, under the influence of events beyond our eastern border, the 2022 energy policy of countries based solely on economic analysis, has been undermined. Nowadays, the strategic perception of energy, its independence, diversification of sources, stability of supply, stockpiles of raw materials, dispersion or, finally, resilience to threats, are equally important. This is not to say that such thinking has not existed in Europe before, but it has definitely been in the vanguard. Today’s overhaul of European countries’ energy systems is beyond economic.

With the above in mind, it is necessary to consider whether Poland’s energy industry is stable, secure, efficient, and whether the existing concepts of its development are defensible when confronted with new challenges. For example – further dispersal of energy generation sources has almost become the raison d’etre of most countries in Europe, but it is the state generation and transmission system that is supposed to guarantee the necessary energy supply to maintain production in times of emergency (e.g. war).

It is therefore worth analyzing in more depth whether accelerating the implementation of the FitFor55 package, under the provisions of RePowerEU in response to Russian aggression, is an effective response to the challenges that have arisen. In our view – no. The move away from Russian hydrocarbons should, of course, be accompanied by the development of renewable-based generating units (and the accompanying infrastructure), but also by a rational approach to the energy resources at the disposal of European countries – coal units powered by domestic raw materials, or nuclear units. Strong acceleration and radical increase in climate targets will be a counter-effective strategy, leading to the impoverishment of European consumers.  We should base plans and decisions on precise calculations and analysis. The loop made of exorbitant climate targets must not take oxygen away from the European economy and elevate energy prices, or we will irretrievably lose the industries we absolutely need to fuel the future. So, while reducing CO2 emissions and building energy efficiency are crucial, the path to zero-carbon should be smooth, economically sound and take into account the use of available sources, including assuming the rational use of coal resources.

The details will be insanely important here, because as the example of Poland has shown, mere access to a raw material such as coal, without proper safety mechanisms and regulations, will not stabilize energy prices. Besides, no EU country has passed the test of community solidarity, as egoistic interests in securing energy resources for their own local market have come to the fore in times of uncertainty.

In our view, the experience of this war should reset some opinions about the future of Poland’s energy architecture, centered around large-scale energy projects currently located mainly in northern Poland. More attention should be paid to dispersing energy sources and relying mainly on renewable sources, stabilized in the future by nuclear, hydrogen, biogas and energy storage facilities. In doing so, it is important to consider what role natural gas facilities will play and what will flow through them in the future. In contrast, coal power generation should remain within the system, as a complementary and stabilizing source, supporting us in a smooth transition, but also guaranteeing energy security for as long as it is necessary.

In 2022, there was a reversal in polarization in the energy industry in 3 areas:

  1. Gas and nuclear power were included in the EU taxonomy,
  2. Poland concentrated on energy from nuclear and offshore wind farms,
  3. In the perspective of two decades, there will be a shift of electricity production from the south to the north of Poland.

In Poland in 2022, it was not possible to notice a particular legislative acceleration enabling increased diversification of energy sources, guaranteeing energy security. Quite the contrary – there was the will to further concentrate the sector. The protracted discussions on the windmill law and direct lines have delayed the passage of these laws, which are extremely important for the development of distributed sources. Meanwhile, wind power should be expanded on a par with photovoltaics to complement each other in the future. The availability of clean and cheap energy should not be held hostage to political struggle. These issues require consensus spanning the divisions.

The scapegoat of the 2022 energy crisis was also the long-developed Commodity Power Exchange. The abolition of the exchange obligation and legal interference in market mechanisms, which was supposed to guarantee a reduction in price fluctuations, in retrospect will not change the market to provide greater flexibility and lower prices, but will strain its transparency.

In 2023 – as in the previous year – the bottleneck for the energy industry will be the distribution network, which cannot accept and distribute the amount of energy we are able to produce at peak times. The associated connection problems basically prevent work on new projects, which in the coming years will exacerbate the deficit of green energy which is badly needed by Polish industry. The PSE company, which manages the grid, sees solutions in expanding existing connections and increasing their capacity, without leaning toward promoting to potential producers the construction of new sources, energy storage, or direct lines that would relieve pressure on the grid. There is also a lack of simplified procedures for entrepreneurs to build their own energy sources. These issues will hopefully be addressed in the updated Energy Policy of Poland 2040 strategy.

The 2022 summary should not overlook positive signs, showing that policymakers are slowly realizing the threat to the overall economy from the green energy deficit in the Polish market. The power of prosumer energy, which is becoming a significant shareholder in the energy market, supporting the green transition, indicates that taking part of the market out of institutional oversight serves a common cause. It is also noticeable that the legal foundation is being laid for the construction of local energy communities planning to invest in renewable energy sources. Local initiatives are an extremely important source of modern energy development, and any state assistance in this regard is most welcome. In doing so, it is important to emphasize the need to relieve the pressure on the high- and medium-voltage power grid, for production and direct distribution of energy locally.

What is also positive is the idea of sharing the profits with surrounding communities for locally produced energy from RES. This leads us to think more deeply about the advantages of renewable energy, especially windmills, which have long since ceased to be associated in the minds of the society with negative environmental effects, and have even become a positive part of the non-urban landscape. The government’s amendment to the windmill law in the form of a mandatory contribution of 10% of the energy generated for local consumers is, in this case, perhaps not the best way to build an investor-community coalition. However, the initiative itself seems to have had a positive reception and, most importantly, has subjected long-held views in this area to critical thinking.

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers also welcomes the amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Law and the extension of the time for the first sale of PV energy in support schemes from 24 to 33 months, putting the technology on a par with wind farms. The basis for these changes was to mitigate the effects of broken supply chains during the pandemic, intended to give PV power generators additional time to adjust to the new market situation and ease price pressures.

We are very happy about the doubling of the auction volume for investments in offshore wind farms (RES Act UC 99). This is an important initiative for investment in this type of RES and, in the future, the basis of the hydrogen industry.

We are closely and optimistically following the preparatory process for a law on so-called cable pooling, i.e. making already owned connection power available to other types of renewable sources, within the framework of the existing connection agreement. The law will allow more flexible use of existing transmission lines, which could translate into additional investment in RES and a rapid increase in the supply of green energy for the Polish economy.

On the other hand, the Law on Emergency Measures to Curb Electricity Prices and Support Certain Consumers in 2023 and its secondary legislation are, in our opinion, inaccurate, and in the opinion of market participants, changes have been introduced that are unfavorable to the entire energy system, which in turn may result in a reduction in energy production in Poland. The rules for calculating the price cap introduced by this regulation pose a threat to the profitability of RES investments. Seeing what role RES played during the summer and autumn months, where the use of renewable energy gave the conventional power industry the time it needed to replenish gas and coal storage, these decisions that are hard to understand.

From the point of view of the entire Polish economy, today the passing of the windmill and direct line laws is an absolute legislative priority, as is the cable pooling law. Investments related to these laws could result in an increased supply of green energy by at least 10 terawatt hours per year, starting in 2026. And this is without any visible contribution from the State, including without a particularly intensive support system.

In this context, there is also a need to rearrange dependencies in the energy industry. The current completely vertical system promotes concentration practices that deviate from the principles of a market economy.

Moving distribution into the realm of market energy would be a revolutionary move, but if it is done with the participation of a Distribution Network Operator, the existing distribution system operators will largely control the process. Such an impulse is already being felt, but the role of the state in this area is to shape it in such a way that the restriction of market principles is minimal and dictated only by Poland’s energy security.

Invariably, the launch of the program of revitalization of multi-dwelling units 200+ (which awaits the concentration of coal assets under the National Energy Security Agency (NABE)) along with passing the wind law, remain important. This would clearly show the direction of Poland’s transition and gradual move away from coal, as well as provide more room for negotiations with the European Commission on Poland’s energy transition path, taking into account the temporarily important role of conventional power generation.

Poland should push the concept of maintaining coal mines and coal power in Europe at a level that allows the economies of European countries to function under the threat of war. In view of the military situation, maintaining only the profit criterion in the European energy industry would be a big mistake, and our country is particularly vulnerable to the consequences of a military conflict with Russia. The wealth of European countries allows the creation and maintenance of an energy reserve base based on fossil fuels.

Poland, as well as Europe, has large coal and lignite deposits that allow to maintain energy independence in special cases, and this should not be abandoned prematurely. Likewise for nuclear sources, for which the plans to extinguish in some EU countries, were a bit too hasty. It is worthwhile to make parallel efforts to develop emission-free technologies for the use of fossil resources. Such an energy policy is in no way at odds with the energy Green Deal and the need to decarbonize the power and heating industry based on carbon-free sources. On the contrary, it can inspire the development of such sources as long as it is coordinated with a program to make the operation of coal blocks more flexible.

The program of revitalization of multi-dwelling units 200+ fits perfectly into such a coordinated policy. We should present the results of this program to the decision-makers in the European Commission and try to get it approved both formally and financially.

The concept outlined above could be integrated into Poland’s overall energy transition and form the basis for optimal development of both renewables and nuclear power.

The most important tasks in 2023 for policy-makers in the Polish energy sector:

  • Passing a law eliminating investment barriers in onshore wind power.
  • Passing a law on direct lines and cable pooling.
  • Refining and passing the law on effective support for energy communities.
  • Promptly developing and passing a law on investment facilitation for renewables on brownfield and post-mining sites.
  • Maximum removal of barriers to development of solar power.
  • Launching a program of revitalization of multi-dwelling units 200+.
  • Strong presence at the European Union level – consistent opposition to ideologically motivated programs to accelerate the energy transition and tighten climate policy;
  • Building a strategy for the use and development of transmission and distribution networks
  • Consistent, planned construction of nuclear power plant(s)
  • Changing the state’s raw materials policy and the creation of permanent stocks to make Poland independent of price fluctuations

Those of the above tasks that are regulatory in nature should be implemented in the first half of 2023, so that their effects on the economy will begin to be felt as early as 2025. This means, as mentioned earlier, an increase in the supply of green energy by at least 10 terawatt hours per year.

Despite the impediments associated with the election year in our country, we are counting on constructive legislative momentum in the energy-related area and the passing of basic and necessary laws to enable the development of modern energy based on distributed sources.

According to ZPP, we could have expected a bit more legislative activity in the energy area in 2022, but the year should definitely not be counted as a lost year in terms of progress in Poland’s energy transition. At the same time, it is worth remembering the consultation-based formula of cooperation between lawmakers and the society, which guarantees far better final results.

From the perspective of the EU energy market, Poland could be one of the few countries secure in terms of energy. However, the lack of crisis solutions and late legislative initiatives have only allowed ad hoc relief, without redefining the energy system. 2023 is the year of another opportunity for those in power to ensure our country’s competitiveness and energy stability.

 

See: 20.01.2023 Summary of 2022 in the energy industry as a year of changes and challenges

Inauguration of the new project of ZPP and Totalizator Sportowy Foundation – “Business for Ukraine Center”

Warsaw, 12 January 2023

 

Inauguration of the new project of ZPP and Totalizator Sportowy Foundation –
“Business for Ukraine Center”


 “Business for Ukraine Center” is a project of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) and the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation, which aims to support the development of Polish-Ukrainian economic relations in the difficult conditions of war and continued attacks by the Russian army on infrastructure and industrial facilities in Ukraine. The center is expected to help several hundred entrepreneurs and companies from Ukraine.

The capital’s Freedom Lounge presented an offer of a new program of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) and the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation on support for Ukrainian companies in launching investment activities in Poland and the European Union. As part of the assistance that will be provided to companies that relocate to Poland during the war and plan to expand into the European market looking for new partners, the “Business for Ukraine Center” will provide, among others, business and localization advice, assistance in finding Polish contractors or investors. The center will also provide its clients with free coworking space. In addition, there will be educational webinars on the conditions for doing business in Poland, current regulations or funding opportunities. Companies will be able to benefit from assistance in finding a location for their business. At the same time, the Center has the opportunity to provide free production space in Warsaw.

The Thursday inauguration of the Center was attended by Minister of Development and Technology of the Republic of Poland Waldemar Buda, President of the Board of Totalizator Sportowy Olgierd Cieślik, President of the Board of the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation Izabela Wyżga, President of the Board of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers Cezary Kaźmierczak and Bogusława Rudecka, Director of the Business for Ukraine Center at ZPP.

The “Business for Ukraine Center” program will also provide assistance and advice to Polish companies that are looking for business partners from Ukraine or are interested in participating in the reconstruction of post-war Ukraine.

“Given the large influx of companies from Ukraine – our data says that some 17,900 Ukrainian companies have been established in Poland – the program opening today fits in very well with this trend, and our first task should be to identify the problems of Ukrainian companies. As a government entity, we always pledge our support for such initiatives” , Minister Waldemar Buda said at the event.

Cezary Kaźmierczak, President of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP): “I am convinced that this next project of ours will benefit both the Ukrainian and Polish entities. For obvious reasons, we are seeing a rapid increase in the interest and activity of Ukrainian companies in the Polish market. In 2022 alone, Ukrainian citizens opened some 20,000 businesses in Poland. We are currently seeing high demand for this project. These days, Ukrainian businesses are looking to Poland for what is most important – security. It is also necessary to take advantage of geographic location, similarity of mentality, proximity of cultures and the natural desire to help one’s neighbor.

Olgierd Cieślik, President of the Board of Totalizator Sportowy: “Totalizator Sportowy has always focused on being active – not only in terms of sports or culture, but also social and business activity. I am pleased that the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation, which we have established, supports such a valuable initiative as the Business for Ukraine Center. I am convinced that thanks to the center, entrepreneurs from Ukraine will gain valuable advice and support, and companies established in Poland will allow to build lasting business relationships to the benefit of both sides.”.

In turn, Ms. Izabela Wyżga, President of the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation, the founder of the program, referred to the aspect of uniqueness of the offer: “Through the Business for Ukraine Center program, we aim to provide Ukrainian citizens with comprehensive assistance for their business in the Republic of Poland and Europe. The program is gaining uniqueness and timeliness, as it offers systemic and comprehensive organizational, administrative, legal, as well as consulting and advisory support to Ukrainian entrepreneurs. First and foremost, this initiative makes it possible to provide custom support to companies that are interested in doing business in our country. Moreover, we firmly believe that our original program will contribute to the development of business relations between Ukrainian and Polish companies, and of international dialogue between Poland and Ukraine to build a Polish-Ukrainian community based on mutual trust, cooperation and openness.

Program Director, Bogusława Rudecka said, “Our offer is aimed at companies with an appetite for growth. In our opinion, the time has come for further development of cooperation with Ukraine and more direct and precise assistance measures tailored to the needs of specific companies. It’s quite a challenge, but we are full of energy to work and to serve Ukrainian companies who, in the face of war, do not give up and try at all costs to find a way out of the difficult situation in which they find themselves”.

The Business for Ukraine Center was established at the initiative of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers and the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation.

The program is financed by the Totalizator Sportowy Foundation, and operated by the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers. The project will be implemented in January-December 2023.

The inauguration of the Business for Ukraine Center was held under the honorary patronage of the Ministry of Development and Technology.

Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers: Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the face of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation

Warsaw, 18 January 2023

 

Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers:
Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the face of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation

Since October 2022, Russia has systematically and methodically been destroying Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. The percentage of heavily damaged energy infrastructure is continuously growing and, according to partners of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, already exceeded 60% before Christmas 2022. Thus, Russia is trying to take the entire Ukrainian nation hostage, including entrepreneurs who are still trying to run their businesses, notwithstanding the ongoing war. In mid-December 2022, as part of the “Europe-Poland-Ukraine. Rebuild Together” project headed by our Union, the Union’s Energy Forum organised a round table meeting “Energy in the context of reconstruction of Ukraine”.

Representatives of energy companies, organisations actively supporting Ukraine, as well as industry experts representing both Ukraine and Poland attended the round table, and among special guests were the following dignitaries:

  • Mateusz Domian, acting Director of the Representative Office of PKN ORLEN in Ukraine and Director of ORLEN Lietuva
  • Sławomir Gładykowski, Vice-President of the Electric Networks Department at MEGAPOL S.A.
  • Oleksandr Kharchenko, Managing Director at Energy Industry Research Center
  • Wojciech Tabiś, Director at the Polish Power Transmission and Distribution Association (PTPiREE)
  • Tomasz Tomasiak, Head of Energy Transition Department at the Polish Development Fund
  • Vadim Utkin, Innovation Manager and Energy Storage Lead at DTEK Group

Dominika Taranko, the Union’s Energy Forum Director and the round table’s host, at the beginning of the event asked about the current state of affairs in Ukraine. The participants of the meeting were told, among other things, that Russians were methodically damaging the country’s energy resources by consciously targeting the power grid with missile strikes so as to prevent its uninterrupted functioning. While the authorities and emergency services were trying to mitigate the effects of the bombings and were conducting repairs round the clock, in many cases, it would become impossible to repair energy facilities and restore power. This situation is a result, among others, of a growing deficiency of spare parts. Due to the lack of standardisation of network solutions in Ukraine, some components are difficult to obtain, even on a global scale. In cases like these, it is not price that is key, but time. For example, a declaration of delivery of a given transformer several weeks to several months from now is not really an option considering the upcoming cold winter months. And while the weather has thus far been rather mild (average air temperatures higher than in previous years), the situation is nonetheless dramatic.

As a consequence of no steady electricity supply, Ukrainian businesses and production have suffered severely, which constitutes a major blow to national economy. Oleksandr Kharchenko, Managing Director at Energy Industry Research Center, assured: “We keep a register of all damages caused by missile strikes and we will demand full compensation from Russia”. However, before this may happen, people and their companies must somehow survive. Our guests acknowledged that businesses have been very flexible. The country’s capital Kyiv is a perfectly exemplifies the fact that, even in a district where there is no electricity whatsoever, one can find restaurants, shops, and service facilities powered by small generators. This equipment ensures operations of cash registers making it possible to sell goods or of coffee machines making it possible to brew coffee in cafés, while customers get the chance to charge their mobile devices and phones.

“Businesses of all sizes reach out to people, supporting and supplying them with small power generators. We adapted to the situation as much as possible in order to keep jobs and help people earn a living. I am impressed with how well Kyiv is dealing with power outages, how Odesa is doing, how quickly entrepreneurs in Dnipro joined forces and ordered a huge number of generators to supply SMEs with electricity. In the city, there is now no shortage of these devices, which are able to provide a small private house with light,” commented Oleksandr Kharchenko.

The situation is very dynamic. When Ukrainians are in need of anything that is not readily available at a given moment, sales offers appear within a week or two. When there is considerable demand for certain products and they are relatively easily available abroad, they quickly reach Ukraine. Companies, especially smaller ones, swiftly organise themselves and deliver goods to Ukraine en masse.

Nevertheless, when it comes to medium and large enterprises, their situation is undoubtedly extremely difficult, as ensuring production continuity or their normal functioning under current conditions is impossible.

“What has been said about small businesses is absolutely true. Kyiv and other cities are ‘alive’. We shall not surrender. You can still drink fantastic coffee in a café. Yet speaking of big business, here’s an example. We produce transformers in Ukraine, for instance, at the Zaporozhtransformer plant. It’s a rather large enterprise and we ordered several transformers from them. They can even repair broken devices, but the problem is that they don’t have energy either. Look how it is all interconnected. We cannot get our equipment back up and running quickly despite a local supply chain in Ukraine, because there’s no power. A large business cannot function on a small power generator. Big business required megawatts of power. And for now, that is out of the question,” added Vadim Utkin, Innovation Manager and Energy Storage Lead at DTEK Group.

Our guests, when asked about their vision of the future, that is the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, emphasised it would certainly not be restored one-to-one for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the post-war map of consumption will certainly be different. For example, the city of Mariupol was completely levelled along with all the production facilities that had operated there. All major energy consumers that used to operate there were destroyed. Is it then possible to restore the supply chain as it was before the war? Surely not.

Furthermore, industry experts are convinced that Ukraine’s energy infrastructure will be rebuilt coal-free. Reconstruction of power generation units as well as the distribution and transmission networks will be carried out in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal and in line with European standards of energy network development. Virtually everyone who works in the energy sector in Ukraine shares this conviction.

Another aspect one must take into account while rebuilding Ukraine’s critical infrastructure is the constant looming threat from the country’s northern neighbour. The risk of a terrorist attack by Moscow will forever remain with Ukrainians. Therefore, the energy network must be rebuilt in a way that guarantees the security of future supply.

Ukrainians are not, however, considering an island mode of operations comprised of local transmission and distribution systems. They are convinced that the system must be cohesive and connected. Still, what is most important is that all links of this system should be as dependable and as resistant to possible future attacks as possible. Discussions on the subject are already being conducted at the country’s highest levels. The goal is to rebuild the system so that it is not susceptible to outside interference.

The general vision of infrastructure reconstruction in Ukraine is of dual nature. On the one hand, traditional nuclear energy will be developed. The country has expertise in this field, human capital, and an existing structure ready for further post-war development. Energoatom employs a large number of qualified, certified specialists and engineers who have everything it takes to take nuclear power generation to another level.

On the other hand, it is clear that renewable energy sources will also be in the centre of attention of the Ukrainian energy system. This applies primarily to energy from wind farms and biomass combustion.

Ukraine has also for some time been working on concepts of systemic electricity storage, including those based on battery systems.

Moreover, experts expect that energy generation from water will gain significance in the form of pumped storage power plants that might be built after the war in Ukraine has ended.

“Ukraine has a vision how to rebuild its energy infrastructure. Of course, we’ll know more when the war is over, because right now we have no idea what will outlast the war. To precisely determine what we should rebuild, we first need to see our post-war shape and which infrastructure survived,” remarked Oleksandr Kharchenko.

According to our guests, both state-owned energy companies and private Ukrainian companies should now strive for the best possible conditions to restore the energy sector on the following principles: independence from carbon, innovation, energy security, full integration with the European energy network, and maximum cooperation with partners in the EU. Efforts are already being made in this direction.

Polish and Ukrainian energy sectors have much in common. Both in Poland and Ukraine, coal-fired power plants have had until this day a rather large share in the energy sector. An extensive energy transformation has already begun in Poland, and over time, coal-fired heat and power plants will be phased out. In this context, Ukrainian specialists focus not only on the domestic, but also on the Polish market for energy storage systems, including battery energy storage systems, which Ukraine is working on.

Vadim Utkin, Innovation Manager and Energy Storage Lead at DTEK Group, stressed: “Every energy system is characterised by two indices: sufficiency, or how many energy generators we have, and flexibility, whether our generators can address the demand for electricity with no hiccups. In terms of sufficiency, before the war, everything in Ukraine was fine. Our country had numerous nuclear power plants, but flexibility had always been a problem.”

Before the war, Ukraine was of course developing renewable energy, but its share was quite low – approx. 10% of all power. In other countries, problems with flexibility are observed only after reaching a share of at least 30% of RES in the energy mix. Ukraine struggled with grid flexibility with a 10% share of renewable energy in the power grid. As a result, renewable sources were often disconnected from the power grid, what translated directly into inflated costs. This was very disappointing for the green energy supporters, because the efforts and financial resources devoted to increasing the share of RES in the system did not translate into Ukraine actually consuming more clean energy.

For this reason, projects involving the creation of energy storage systems were so necessary in Ukraine. The war became, in a sense, a catalyst for these activities. Currently, Ukrainians are developing several scenarios how to expand the Energy Storage System project. A large part of the infrastructure is planned in the west, close to the Polish border. A major challenge in this project is to guarantee its physical security. Looking at the energy storage system, a seaport comes to mind, as there are numerous containers visible on the surface, which are potential targets for missile strikes.

In this context, ideas of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine are quite obvious. As our Ukrainian experts remarked, there are many municipalities on both sides of the border. Poland also experiences periods of energy deficiency, during which it starts looking closely at foreign exports. But it has also identified challenges on its territory related to the flexibility of the system. Therefore, deploying battery systems in Poland seems like a worthwhile idea, while operators on both sides of the border, working under an agreement, could provide system balancing services. This could prove to be a smart and quite unexpected solution to the problem, effective even in wartime. The issue of the physical protection of such facilities becomes irrelevant in this scenario, since Poland is a member of NATO and its situation is far different from the position of Ukraine.

Ukrainian experts believe that ideas of building underground infrastructure are misplaced. On the one hand, the cost of such projects is exorbitant, because issues related to drainage or temperature control are major problems in such systems. This also applies to energy storage systems and substations. On the other hand, all protection systems have their weaknesses, and the first question should be what we are protecting ourselves from. Are we protecting ourselves from X55-class drones and missiles, which are widely used by the Russians? Or are we protecting ourselves from ballistic missiles? These are vastly distinct levels of protection. And this should also be considered.

Energy storage systems are now extremely sought after in Ukraine, because energy reserves are very scarce. Power reserves and energy storage systems help a lot in such demanding situations when the frequency in the grid drops by 50%, as it did happen on 23rd October 2022.

During the meeting in December, Mateusz Domian representing the ORLEN Group described the company’s pre-war involvement in the Ukrainian market, and concerned, among others, the fuel market. Presently, one of the problems in Ukraine is the lack of continuity of electricity supply, which is why energy from generators that run on fuel has become a natural substitute. Small business, by using low-power devices such as cash registers or company lights, have the ability to cope with power outages. However, in order to maintain the operation of activities with higher power consumption, such as petrol stations, the waiting time for the appropriate generators equals as much as even 2 months.

Currently, there is no fuel production in Ukraine, and all fuels are imported. The availability of engine fuels in Ukraine has become problematic, there is no indication, however, that they would run out. Not everyone can afford it, but it is available. Generally, in previous years, the period between autumn and winter was characterised by lower fuel supply both in Europe and in Ukraine. However, during the war period, in particular in autumn 2022, the demand for fuels in Ukraine increased by 30%. Due to the greater interest in fuels on the part of our south-eastern neighbour, the price of fuels in Poland and Lithuania also increased, which, however, is not a factor limiting supplies, as the most important thing is to ensure the availability of fuels on all these markets.

Mateusz Domian claimed: “The Ukrainian fuel industry is extremely efficient and there are no serious problems with the availability of fuels”. In fact, the first quarter of last year in Ukraine was difficult and it was hard to come by fuel, for example in Kyiv. At the outbreak of the war, more than 60% of Ukrainian diesel fuel was imported from Russia or Belarus. However, these import channels were rapidly replaced. Currently, fuel reaches Ukraine from many directions, such as Poland, Romania and Hungary. Nevertheless, it is Ukraine itself that must ensure that the channels remain available. The main logistic connections in fuel transport are operated by rail, which requires improvement, for instance on the Polish-Ukrainian border. As of now, half of fuel transports are carried out by fuel trucks, which are currently lacking on the market. Thinking about substitutes for grid power, which is non-operational during the war due to damages, the most important thing is to develop logistics of liquid fuel supply.

This situation will only improve following the restoration of infrastructure (if the Russian shelling stops) or with the beginning of warmer months in March 2023 and a reduced demand for power.

The representative of the ORLEN Group also did not want to elaborate due to the ongoing conflict on the company’s current plans for Ukraine. However, Ukraine has always been of interest to Poland’s domestic multi-energy concern, also in terms of acquisitions. As our guests emphasised, all plans would be implementation-ready when the country become stable again – a problem since 2014. It is expected that the challenges related to economic stability in Ukraine will change from month to month, along with the cessation of hostilities. Only then companies will be able to return investment negotiations and to resume their broad involvement activities on the Ukrainian market. The ORLEN Group sees immense potential in Ukraine, if only because of its population size that is comparable to Poland. The Ukrainian side has also asked the Polish market leader to work hand in hand in fuel market development. However, it is currently difficult to discuss restoring fuel production in Ukraine. Any business can see that in the face of active military aggression by Russia, it is difficult to develop an infrastructure that can be destroyed in the blink of an eye.

Polish Power Transmission and Distribution Association Director Wojciech Tabiś highlighted the fact that cooperation in the field of power engineering with the Ukrainian side had taken place for many years. He pointed out that Poland changed its power system in 1995 to a UCTE standardised one, while Ukraine looked into this process for its own needs before the war broke out. The hitherto long-term cooperation between the two parties resulted in the creation of the so-called Khmelnytskyi Island, which operated in Ukraine within the UCTE system. The current cooperation with Ukraine consists of, among other things, analyses of operations on a voltage of 230V. Before the war, activities were carried out over a long period of time aimed at Ukraine joining the standards of the European Union. The war certainly accelerated these changes.

Currently, the Polish side is receiving lists materials required to reconstruct the power grid in Ukraine on an ongoing basis. The power grid is highly fragmented. The cooperation of Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne (Polish Power Grids) with UKRENERGO and DETEK requires coordinated efforts based on an agreement between the ministries of both countries – the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy. What constitutes a challenge is the structure of the Ukrainian energy sector, which is technologically different from the Polish energy sector. In Poland, we have other voltage levels than the Ukrainian power industry and we are therefore unable to provide either equipment or spare parts. The Polish side has already transferred almost all the equipment of the Widełka 750 kW substation (autotransformers, circuit breakers, disconnectors), because it could be applied in Ukraine due to the right voltage levels. We do not have, however, the right equipment of grids of 800 kW, 500 kW, 300 kW that are used in Ukraine. They are non-standard power levels. We are unable to assist our neighbours in this case. Wojciech Tabiś stated: “We hit a brick wall, so to speak, which means that in this case we have already used all the reserves that Polish energy companies had at their disposal. By sending those reserves to Ukraine, we are only left with the bare minimum, a necessary level to, among others, undertake current repairs domestically.”

Therefore, there are no more reserves in Poland that the Ukrainian transmission system could make use of. Consequently, it would be appropriate to approach the problem now from a different angle, namely, to begin cooperation in Poland in terms of production of materials and equipment that would meet Ukrainian standards. The Ukrainian side even asked their Polish counterparts to send them broken switches or disconnectors, but the applicable regulations prohibit the imports of such devices to Ukraine, because according to the law they are waste. This requires an urgent liberalisation of Ukrainian import regulations.

In principle, all energy companies in Poland are open to cooperation with Ukraine. This also concerns, perhaps above all, distributed energy. This branch of energy production, based on renewable sources, has already grown in Poland. It is very difficult to import and produce high-power generation sources, and these are long-term processes, requiring time that Ukraine does not have. However, it is easy to install photovoltaic sources, locate low-power transformers, and build such energy facilities from scratch. It also seems natural that the destruction of the Ukrainian energy system should constitute an impulse to rebuild the network in accordance with the UCTE standard enforced in Europe. Primarily where this infrastructure was completely destroyed.

What also characterises the crisis is the fact that certain processes have accelerated and Ukraine may use this opportunity to rebuild its infrastructure basing on European standards.

As far as the transfers of electricity between Poland and Ukraine are concerned, it was possible to separate the already mentioned Khmelnytskyi Island from the Ukrainian energy system, powered by a local nuclear power plant, which produced energy that was later sent to Poland. Operational tests of this system had already been carried out. However, due to the ongoing Russian aggression, there is currently no exchange of energy between the two countries. The idea of supplying energy from Poland to Ukraine is also unfeasible at the moment, as both high-voltage connections are currently non-operational. At the same time, debates and works are underway to create connections at a lower voltage, for which devices transforming the different Polish and Ukrainian voltages would be necessary. In order to implement this, initiative is required on both sides of the border.

Sławomir Gładykowski, Vice-President of the Electric Networks Department at MEGAPOL S.A., predicts that the reconstruction of Ukraine will take place in two stages. First, power must be restored to industrial production. Second, a national post-war concept must be drafted. However, as it is impossible to foresee the end of the conflict, the network should now be rebuilt with cable lines instead of overhead lines. Building power stations underground is also worth considering. This process is more costly, but it provides greater security.

As far as the post-war reconstruction is concerned, it is a matter of legislation, so the legal foundations must first be laid. It is necessary to define priorities that will allow for faster reconstruction in the Ukrainian reality than it would take place in Poland, in our local legal system.

Tomasz Tomasiak, Head of Energy Transition Department at the Polish Development Fund, is also of the opinion that Ukraine will be rebuilt in two stages. The first stage is winning the war, because there can unfortunately be no question of new investments due to the ongoing military operations and the risk of their immediate destruction. At this stage, Ukraine can count on support and financial aid from EU countries. As for the post-war situation, talks are already in place on the reconstruction of Ukraine, both by the EU countries along with the United States and business communities. Ukraine’s potential as a neighbouring country of the EU is noticeable. And the prospect of it becoming a member of the Community in the near future is real. Other countries and the world of business have already realised this truth. After Ukraine wins the war, funding will surely not be an issue. The Polish Development Fund has two types of instruments at its disposal: aimed at supporting and investments (commercial ones). If the PDF received funds to support Ukraine, it would distribute them. The Fund already now possesses funds that can be invested, but it is difficult to make use of them in rebuilding Ukrainian infrastructure while an active armed conflict is still ongoing. This does not mean, however, that these funds cannot be invested in Poland for such purposes as for instance the production of parts or components for Ukraine’s present needs.

Tomasz Tomasiak also addressed the issue of rebuilding the power system. In his opinion, the example of Ukraine shows that distributed, local, cluster systems, or the so-called energy islands, will be a principal element in Ukraine’s power industry of the future. It seems that these systems are the future, they guarantee energy security for local communities, and at the same time unburden the transmission system. The energy from large power plants can be then transferred to production plants.

Certainly, the goal itself is to standardise the Ukrainian power industry in accordance with European standards. In the power industry, the production of certain devices or equipment that are uncommon required sometimes up to 2-3 years. Meanwhile, standard devices can be purchased directly on the market. Moreover, cheaper, used ones are also readily available.

An essential issue from the point of view of power supply is the availability of power sources, that is fuels or renewable energy. At the same time, greater independence, which works well during a conflict, can apparently be achieved from such sources as water, wind or sun, which do not need to be imported. The use of renewable energy is also related to thinking about energy efficiency, and it often turns out that in winter months considerably less energy is needed to heat a house after thermal modernisation.

Europe’s pursuit of electric solutions, for example switching to electric transport or the everyday use of heat pumps, may also be vital in the reconstruction of Ukraine. The Green Hub project implemented by the Polish Development Fund, which aims to implement Poland’s energy transformation, has already been recognised in the European Union, according to the Fund’s representative. Green Hub could function as a role model for Ukrainian energy transformation. The more so that renewable sources will play a rather key role in its future development.

Gennadiy Radchenko, Director of the Ukraine Business Center at the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, was asked to summarise the round table discussion. He pointed out that not only Ukrainians suffer from power outages, but so does the industry. However, the industry was able to adapt to the new reality astoundingly quickly. Entrepreneurs do their best to meet their needs by importing large power generators, for which there is currently a huge global demand, disproportionate to the available supply. It is worth mentioning that the production of energy from power generators costs 10 times more than grid energy, which translates into significantly higher production costs. According to Radchenko, considering the current state of affairs in Ukraine, far-reaching international cooperation should be established between industries in Poland and Ukraine. Business ought to be included in creation of solutions needed on the Ukrainian market. A good answer to present challenges would be to establish production facilities for Ukraine in Poland, which would carry out the most necessary orders for reconstruction. It would be beneficial for both countries. It should be noted that after the war, the entire Ukrainian energy system will turn away from Russian solutions and switch to European standards. At the same time, it is necessary to deal with legal solutions and start executing projects that, while they take time, may materialise soon. Therefore, red tape and bureaucratic barriers to post-war reconstruction should be eliminated as early as now. Because it certainly is much easier nowadays to solve engineering problems than bureaucratic ones.

Radchenko also expressed his gratitude for the support that Poland has given to the Ukrainian nation, stating that we are now in the best time for cooperation between the two nations ever in history.

See more: 18.01.2023 Memorandum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the face of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation

Updated Economic Forecast of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (the ZPP) for 2022

Warsaw, 30 December 2022 

 

Updated Economic Forecast of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (the ZPP) for 2022

 

GDP growth

Formerly: 3.7%
Now: 4.5%

Inflation

Formerly: 12.5%
Now: 14.2%

Unemployment

Formerly: 5.1%
Now: 5.3%

Investments

Formerly: 16.2%
Now: 16.5%

Forecasts of international institutions

Recent years have not been conducive to macroeconomic forecasts. Traditional time-series econometrics works well especially in conditions of relative calmness.  Although a properly constructed model is resistant to shocks (those fade over time), geopolitical chaos makes forecasting based on the past complicated. Under such conditions, machine learning models or neural networks can be used.

Regardless of the situation, some institutions are obliged to publish forecasts and models.  This must be done, for example, by the Ministry of Finance in the draft budget law.  For 2022, the Ministry of Finance forecasts real economic growth of 4.6%, a registered unemployment rate of 5.0% (LFS 2.7%), inflation of either 13.5% (CPI) or 13.3% (HICP) and investments of 4.9%. The forecast of the European Commission, available on the website of the Ministry of Finance, assumes real GDP growth of 4%, HICP inflation of 13.3%, unemployment of 2.7%, and an investment rate of 3.7%.

With regard to the GDP growth, the OECD is slightly more optimistic than Eurostat and  forecasts 4.5% for 2022. Inflation is to amount to 14.2%, of which the core inflation (without food and energy components) is to be 8.7%. Unemployment is forecast at 2.9%.  With regard to the forecasts of the World Bank for Poland in 2022, GDP growth of 4% is expected,  gross fixed capital formation (investments) of 4.9%, inflation of 13.2%.

To sum up, the consensus of international institutions for Poland’s GDP growth can be set at 4%, inflation at 13% and unemployment at 3%.  The Ministry of Finance is slightly more optimistic and assumes higher economic growth and single-digit inflation.

Forecast of the ZPP


GDP growth

In 2022, GDP will increase but at a slower pace than expected.  The government faces difficult decisions – inflation is one of the most urgent areas in this regard.  Private investments are determined by the current condition of the global economy, which is recovering after the COVID-19 pandemic.  The choice of location is also influenced by its security, and the outbreak of war in Ukraine has placed Poland dangerously close to the front.

The GDP dynamics observed in the first half of 2022 is encouraging  as, compared to the same period in 2021, GDP increased by  more than 16% in nominal terms. Based on the ZPP forecasts for the second half of 2022, it  will amount to 14.8% year-on-year. This is very close to the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance, which assumes nominal GDP growth of 15.1%.  However, a large part of this increase is due to inflation, which causes a disproportionate increase in nominal GDP.

According to our estimates, real GDP growth will amount to 4.5%.

Year-on-year inflation

In all likelihood, in 2023, inflation will still be high, although it will slow down somewhat due to base effects. The fact that 2023 is an election year  is an issue. This limits the government’s room for manoeuvre.  Normally, an element of the fight against price increases is reduction of social packages.  The government is under strong pressure to maintain spending or even slightly increase it. For the time being, the continuation of payment of additional pension and child benefit has been confirmed.  The VAT reduction on food is also to be maintained but not on fuel.

The year-on-year inflation in 2022, observed so far, was 9.7% in Q1, 13.9% in Q2 and 16.3% in Q3, respectively. For Q4 of this year, the ZPP forecasts a year-on-year inflation of 17%. Therefore, for the whole of 2022, the inflation rate will amount to approximately14.2%,  in our opinion. Further slight increases are expected at the beginning of next year, although the pace of inflation has slowed down significantly.  We will experience a noticeable decrease only in 2024.

Unemployment rate

Traditionally, in a crisis situation, decision-makers choose whether to care more about fighting inflation or about employment. The government clearly appreciates the importance of employment.  Various measures are being designed to maintain or even reduce unemployment.  Ukrainian refugees are also being activated professionally.  Based on the data, a significant proportion of Ukrainian refugees, despite their specific demographic structure, have found work in Poland.  Previously, despite the pandemic, the government managed to maintain employment.

The Statistics Poland data for 2022 is as follows: 5.8% for Q1, 5.2% for Q2 and 5.1% for Q3.  For Q4, the ZPP forecasts an unemployment rate of 5.2%. This means the total unemployment rate of 5.3% in 2022. Moreover, the ZPP predicts that as a result of the slowly improving macroeconomic situation, as well as potential development opportunities resulting from the participation of Polish companies in the reconstruction of Ukraine, unemployment  will slowly decrease in 2023.

Investment rate

It can be said that for years, despite regular critical opinions, stimulating investments has not burdened Polish economic policy as much as, for example, social programmes. Obviously, the introduction of further benefits translated into an increase in consumption, and this, in turn, into an increase in GDP.  However, many experts pointed out that this consumption causes an increase in demand for goods that are easy to produce, which does not translate into an improvement in the competitiveness of the Polish economy. At the same time, the consumption booster works well in conditions of prosperity; however, it is investment spending that allows economic growth to be maintained during a period of slowdown.  Unfortunately, those predictions proved accurate. In 2021, the investment rate in the economy amounted to only approximately 17%.

With regard to 2022 and 2023, much will depend  on whether the government has sufficient resources to attract private investors through public investments.  A strong investment boost will come from increased spending on defence.  The energy sector also needs investments.  Unblocking funds from the National Reconstruction Plan will be important for digitisation and climate projects. In turn, ensuring relative regulatory stability will be of key importance to promoting private investments. Taking the above into account, for 2022, the ZPP forecasts the investment rate of 16.5%.

 

See: 30.12.2022 Updated Economic Forecast of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (the ZPP) for 2022

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