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Statement of business community from Poland and Ukraine

Warsaw, 27 July 2023


Statement of business community from Poland and Ukraine

 

Business community calls on Governments of Ukraine and Republic of Poland to improve functioning of checkpoints on Ukrainian-Polish border and sign Joint Border Agreement between countries.

The business community, united by the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine, European Business Association, Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Association of International Road Cargo Carriers, Ukrainian League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Union of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs, All-Polish Union of Road Transport Employers, Polish Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers,  calls on the Governments of Ukraine and Republic of Poland to facilitate the development of existing joint checkpoints and construction of new ones on the Ukrainian-Polish border as well as to ensure the soonest signing of the Joint Border Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine.

The full-scale war in Ukraine has immensely affected the supply chains of goods. Due to the closure of Ukraine’s airspace, the blockade of some of Ukraine’s sea and river ports, and significant damage to the country’s railway network and infrastructure, road freight transportation through the western checkpoints became almost the only means of international goods transportation.

Despite the joint efforts of the Ukrainian and Polish sides and related parties to establish an effective passage of commercial vehicles through the western checkpoints on the border, namely: systematic development of road infrastructure on the Ukrainian and Polish sides of the border, assistance to modernize the Shehyni-Medyka border crossing point, the introduction of an electronic queue at all existing checkpoints, commercial vehicles are forced to stand idle at the border for several days, while the existing arrangements for the electronic queue for all participants require improvements.

According to the electronic queue data, as of the beginning of July current year, the waiting time in the general queue at the Yahodyn-Dorohusk checkpoint is approximately 7 days, and the waiting time in the queue for veterinary control is over 13 days. Obviously, the waiting time leads to a slowdown in the turnover of goods and financial losses for the carriers due to transport delays and breaches of contracts. According to rough estimates of carriers, a day of idle time for a commercial vehicle costs 300-400 euros.

In order to stimulate the reduction of queues at the borders, decrease the duration of inspection, reduce financial losses for idle time for commercial vehicles, avoid penalties for late implementation of international contracts, and speed up export-import operations between Ukraine and the EU countries, which is especially crucial in the conditions of complicated logistics and infrastructure restrictions during the war, the business community calls on the Governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland to:

  • ensure the soonest signing of the Joint Border Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland;
  • strengthen the dialogue between the Ukrainian and Polish sides and relevant EU institutions on the improvement of current joint checkpoints and establishment of new ones on the Polish-Ukrainian border by using available tools of intergovernmental cooperation and mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy;
  • contribute to the search for ways to converge customs procedures at the Polish-Ukrainian checkpoints and the development of appropriate recommendations for changing the customs legislation of Ukraine and the practices of the state customs services of both countries;
  • speed up the decision-making process by the State Customs Service of Ukraine on the modernization of border crossing points on the Ukrainian-Polish border.

We express our gratitude to the responsible Ukrainian and Polish state authorities for all efforts to ensure a smooth cargo flow in both directions between Ukraine and the EU.

 

See more: Statement of business community from Poland and Ukraine

Memorandum ZPP: “Ukraine’s Resource Policy – Strategic Resources and Rare Earth Metals”

Warsaw, 17 July, 2023

 

Memorandum ZPP: “Ukraine’s Resource Policy – Strategic Resources and Rare Earth Metals”

 

  • Without strategic resources, it will be difficult to achieve the climate goals of EU countries, as they are essential for the production of photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.
  • China supplies 98% of rare earth metals.
  • 21 out of the 34 critical elements (identified by the EU) are found in Ukraine, where, simultaneously, 117 out of the 120 globally used materials are being extracted.
  • The World Bank predicts a 500% increase in demand for rare earth metals by 2050.
  • In 2021, the EU and Ukraine entered into an alliance to enhance technological and industrial cooperation in the field of rare earth metal extraction.
  • It is assumed that the rare earth resources were one of the reasons for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

We present a memorandum summarizing the discussion during the IV roundtable of the ZPP Energy and Climate Forum, dedicated to Ukrainian energy, and conducted within the EUROPE-POLAND-UKRAINE REBUILT TOGETHER 2023 project in collaboration with the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland.

The participants of the debate were:

Anna Burkowicz, Specialist at the Department of Mineral Resource Management, Raw Materials Policy Laboratory, Polish Academy of Sciences
Roman Dryps, Chief Operating Officer, Center for Business Consulting, Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce
Roman Opimakh, President, State Geological and Subsoil Survey of Ukraine
Dr. Jarosław Szlugaj, Assistant Professor at the Department of Mineral Resource Management, Raw Materials Policy Laboratory, Polish Academy of Sciences
Seweryn Szwarocki, Director of Strategy and Sustainable Development, LW Bogdanka SA

Moderator:

Dominika Taranko, Director of the ZPP Energy and Climate Forum

Rare Earth Metal Resources in Ukraine

Roman Opimakh, President of the State Geological and Subsoil Survey of Ukraine, pointed out that Ukraine signed a memorandum of strategic partnership regarding rare earth metals with the European Union in 2021. At the same time, the EU outlined the EU Critical Raw Material Act until 2030, defining joint actions of the member states and necessary regulations that need to be implemented under EU law. Ukraine is currently a candidate for EU membership, and Ukrainians perceive themselves as Europeans, adhering to the same principles, values, and strategic goals. Therefore, Ukraine’s objectives in the field of rare earth metals align with the goals of the European Union’s policy. Ukrainians intend to remain a reliable and stable trading partner in terms of extraction, processing, and supply of rare earth metals, as well as components for the battery industry, as well as the disposal of used equipment with recovery of raw materials. Consequently, a concept of establishing an entire value chain within Ukraine for supplying the EU is being developed.

Extraction and production potential of Ukraine regarding critical raw materials is among the highest in the world. Ukraine is among the top 10 global producers of titanium, kaolin, manganese, iron ore, graphite, zirconium, uranium, as well as raw materials essential for modern technologies such as beryllium, aluminum, nickel, and cobalt. Ukraine holds resources for 21 out of the 34 minerals identified by the EU as critical. Therefore, the Ukrainian government has implemented an open-door policy for foreign investments, preparing a list of 100 regions in which licensing and acquisition of exploration and production concessions will be available. Another way to enter the Ukrainian market today could be through acquiring existing concessions through agreements with local companies, thus fostering cooperation within consortia. Cooperation within greenfield and brownfield investment types is being considered. For future investment needs, 1,200 deposits of rare earth minerals have been identified, and conceptual maps have been developed. There are locations where operations can already be conducted.

Titanium – Ukraine is among the top 10 countries with documented titanium deposits worldwide and provides 7% of global production (data from 2021). Currently, titanium is extracted in Ukraine along with ilmenite, rutile, and zirconium in six deposits, yielding 900,000 tons of concentrate containing 350,000 tons of titanium annually. Currently, the largest producer and processor of titanium in Europe, JSC United Mining & Chemical Company, is being privatized.

Lithium – Currently not mined in Ukraine, but its resources constitute 1/3 of Europe’s deposits. Three lithium oxide deposits have been identified for future development. One of the deposits is already under the concession of UkrLithiumMining LLC.

Other metals such as tantalum, niobium, and beryllium – have been identified in six deposits, with tantalum and niobium also occurring as by-products of titanium deposits. Beryllium is found in the Perzhanske deposit, where 15.3 thousand tons of beryllium oxide are located, along with tantalum, niobium, zirconium, tin, molybdenum, lithium, and zinc, among others. The concession for this deposit has been held by BGV Group since 2019.

Cobalt – It is found in 12 deposits containing 9 thousand tons of this element. Ukraine processes significant amounts of imported cobalt and nickel, which is handled by Pobuzhsky Ferronickel company.

Graphite – Ukraine possesses some of the world’s five largest graphite deposits, amounting to 19 million tons of ore with concentrations ranging from 5% to 8%. Currently, 5 thousand tons of graphite concentrate are extracted annually from six deposits. The concession for these deposits is currently held by the Australian company Volt Resources.

Ukraine has favorable geological conditions for the occurrence of rare earth metals. As part of the mentioned strategic partnership with the EU, a Roadmap for 2023-2024 has been defined, which incorporates environmental protection and “green mining” (low emissions in the mining industry) as priorities in the envisioned methods of resource extraction. Ukraine has also been involved in the process of creating EU regulations regarding the use of rare earth metals until 2030. In terms of cooperation, the Ukrainian Geological Survey has developed a geological map highlighting the extraction potential and has devised incentives for investors interested in the mining industry, including the extraction of rare earth metals.

Abundance of Rare Earth Metals in Poland

Dr. Eng. Jarosław Szlugaj, Assistant Professor at the Department of Mineral Resource Management in the Laboratory of Raw Materials Policy at the Polish Academy of Sciences, emphasized that his unit has been monitoring the management process of mineral resources for almost 30 years. They oversee all mineral resources located in Poland that are subject to trade and are simultaneously produced or consumed. A thematic publication titled “Balance of Poland’s Mineral Resource Management,” which covers over 100 types of resources, is being issued on the topic. The list of critical resources for the European Union continues to expand. Over the past 10 to 20 years, their utilization has become widespread, and today we are facing a new situation in which Poland, the European Union, and the world consume vast amounts of resources, many times greater than in past decades and centuries.

Poland consumes significant amounts of rare earth metals imported from abroad. Unfortunately, it does not have its own sources or deposits of rare earth metals, so reliance must be placed solely on imports. However, there is resource potential, especially in terms of resource recovery. With the dismantling of the Wizów Chemical Plants (where phosphoric acid was produced from apatite from the Kola Peninsula, enriched with rare earth elements), there is a repository of post-production waste from which rare earth metals can still be extracted. Currently, no recovery is being carried out because none of the tested technologies allow for it on an industrial scale.

As a result, Poland imports increasing amounts of rare earth metals (mostly in the form of oxides, not necessarily in separated form). They are mainly used as glass colorants, polishing agents, but also in batteries, electric motors, or permanent magnets. Poland only imports finished products, especially when it comes to permanent magnets.

The situation is similar with lithium. Thanks to foreign investments, Poland has become a significant producer of lithium-ion batteries, primarily used in the automotive industry. The entire process involves importing raw materials, processed in the source country of imported product. Semi-finished products reach Poland, where they are assembled to create finished batteries. Currently, Poland does not have domestic facilities utilizing these advanced technological processes and production methods. Everything relies on enterprises owned by foreign investors.

Strategic resources (according to the list of 34 identified by the EU) possessed by Poland.

Poland essentially possesses only two strategic resources that it independently processes on a larger scale. The first is coking coal, which is used to produce coke, a crucial component in steel production processes. The second is copper, recently added to the list.

On March 16, 2023, the European Commission published the announced draft regulation on critical and strategic raw materials for the European Union’s economy. The document also includes a new, updated list of critical raw materials (CRM). The CRM Act aims to stimulate the production of strategic resources by intensifying new activities related to extraction and recycling within the European Union. Furthermore, it seeks to increase awareness of potential threats related to raw material supplies, supply chains, and related opportunities among EU countries, enterprises, and investors.

The published new list of critical raw materials (CRM) in the document COM(2023) 160 final titled “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations” expands the list of critical raw materials for the EU (available in Annex II, Section 1).

 Antimony

 Fluorite

 Helium

 Nickel

 Strontium

 Arsenic

 Phosphorites

 Cobalt

 Niobium

 Tantalum

 Bauxite / Aluminum

 Phosphorus

Silicon metal

 PGM – platinoids

 Titanium

 Barite

 Gallium

 Lithium

 Heavy REE

 Vanadium

 Beryllium

 Germanium

 Magnesium

 Light REE

 Coke coal

 Bismuth

 Graphite

 Manganese

 Spodumene

 Tungsten

 Boron / Borates

 Hafnium

 Copper

 Scandium

 

Table description: Critical raw materials for the European Union according to the European Commission (2023). New CRMs compared to the 2020 list are marked in red. Strategic raw materials for the European Union are indicated in italics.

Source of compilation: PIG-BIP.

In the process of preparing the document, 70 different substances were analyzed, assessing their economic importance and estimating supply risks. Ultimately, the number of identified elements was increased from 30 to 34. Although the document refers to “34 critical raw materials,” there are actually more, as rare earth metals are presented as two resources: HREE (heavy rare earth elements) and LREE (light rare earth elements), aside from which, PGM (platinum group metals) account for an additional 5 noble metals. The highest level of supply risk applies to heavy rare earth metals.

It is also worth comparing the proposed European list (2023) with the American list, which includes 50 items (2022 – https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals ).

In 2023, helium reappeared in the European register after being absent for the past three years, and the newly designated critical raw materials are copper, nickel, spodumene and arsenic. An interesting case is copper and nickel, which, although they do not meet the CRM thresholds, are included in the list according to the Critical Raw Materials Act. Conversely, indium and natural rubber have been removed from this year’s compilation. A novelty is the identification of several strategic raw materials within the critical raw materials (16 out of 34). The list is updated every 3 years. The strategic importance is determined based on the material’s significance for green transformation, digital technologies, defense applications and space exploration.

Among the newly added CRMs, Poland has mineral deposits and prospects for further documentation for the following resources:

  • Raw spodumene materials (mostly in Lower Silesia, but also in Lesser Poland)
  • Helium (Wielkopolska) – recovery from natural gas
  • Polymetallic deposits, primarily copper (Lower Silesia and Lubusz Land)
  • Arsenic (Lower Silesia and as a co-occurring element in other deposits in Upper Silesia)
  • Nickel (Lower Silesia)

The CRM Act document should help develop activities in the field of scientific research and innovation, negotiate trade agreements, and implement new projects related to the exploration and exploitation of critical raw materials.

Unfortunately, Poland does not possess resources for most strategic raw materials necessary for the production of devices related to “new energy,” such as wind turbines or photovoltaics. In the past, crystalline silicon, which is the basis for every photovoltaic cell, was produced in the country. However, production ceased after privatization and foreign acquisition.

Participation of foreign investors in the mining industry of Ukraine

In Europe today, the mining industry is no longer common, which is why Ukraine’s focus on the development of this sector has attracted the interest of foreign investors. Ukraine invites foreign investors to increase extraction activities on its territory due to its rich mineral deposits and the industry’s long-standing history. The State Geological Survey conducts concession procedures, concludes cooperation agreements, and possesses other instruments to encourage investors. Several major Polish companies operate in Ukraine, including Cersanit, which mines kaolin and conducts wide-scale market sales of ceramic products. Before the war, there were discussions with KGHM Polska Miedź SA regarding investments, and the Ukrainian authorities are ready to resume these discussions. The Ukrainian government seeks to provide comprehensive assistance to investors by conducting webinars, providing maps, mostly in an online format today. Additionally, a memorandum has been signed with the Polish Geological Institute, which is evidence of the development of a strategic Polish-Ukrainian partnership.

Ukraine can prove to be an attractive market for LW Bogdanka SA, which is seeking future directions for business diversification. Seweryn Szwarocki, Director of Strategy and Sustainable Development at LW Bogdanka SA, emphasized that Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka SA is the most efficient coal mine in Poland. In the face of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the demand for coal has increased, but the Management Board of LW Bogdanka SA, aware of the need for energy transformation associated with the new climate goals set by the European Union, has committed to phasing out coal production by 2049. The company is preparing for these plans to ensure the continuity of its operations.

As a result of conducted analyses regarding the possibility of mining other resources, on May 17th, the company published a new strategy. Its main objectives are to maintain production capacity, sustain high profitability indicators, selectively extract type 34 coal, diversify revenues by expanding the areas of operation, and identify, assess and document new reserves of type 35 coking coal.

The main goal of LW Bogdanka’s new strategy for the years 2023-2030 is to create an innovative multi-commodity corporation that drives green transformation and secures the economic development of the Lublin region and, more broadly, central-eastern Poland. Through business diversification, LW Bogdanka can potentially engage in the extraction of selected critical resources for the EU, including possibly in the Ukrainian market.

Given that the mining industry is capital-intensive and involves complex processes, Bogdanka SA has an advantage over its competitors due to its extensive mining experience. While the company’s current activities are focused on the Lublin region, new mining projects are being sought. The western lands of Ukraine stand out as a potential area, considering their rich mineral deposits, especially those utilized in the energy transformation process. However, due to the ongoing armed conflict on Poland’s eastern border, the current opportunities for cooperation are limited. Investments in a war-torn country carry the risk of uncontrolled destruction in the areas where the company operates.

Nevertheless, Bogdanka SA confirms that it is conducting analyses regarding the extraction of several potential resources, with the criterion being their inclusion on the list of critical raw materials for the European Union. LW Bogdanka also sees the prospect of cooperation with the existing mining industry in Ukraine, given the lower level of digitalization compared to its Ukrainian counterparts. The Polish company is also willing to engage in technological exchange. However, due to the nature of the company as a publicly traded entity, all planned investments have a long-term perspective, and the process of selecting investment locations can be time-consuming.

Considering the existing legislative difficulties related to the mining  of critical resources, there is a need for legal acceleration of investment processes. Additionally, an important aspect for deciding on the exploration, assessment and mining of a specific resource is the size of the deposit and the estimated level of extraction difficulty.

Adapting Ukrainian Geological Law for Mining Investments

Recently, the Ukrainian government has introduced a package of numerous legal changes regarding the regulation of the mining industry. The practices of European countries served as a model for the legislative amendments. The experts knowledgeable in this field were also consulted. Many outdated regulations have been removed from Ukraine’s legal system, which should facilitate business operations. In some cases, it will no longer be necessary to participate in tenders to start activities. The mining process can commence as early as one and a half years after obtaining an environmental impact assessment. Investment opportunities have been increased, among other things, by introducing electronic deposit maps. Upon selecting an area for investment, all necessary information about the area of interest can be obtained both online and in person.

The State Service of Geology and Subsoil of Ukraine expects increased international cooperation, especially with the EU, regarding planned initiatives. A cooperation agreement has been signed within the framework of a memorandum with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development regarding a three-year program for the digitalization of services, particularly those related to geological information. Another important task for the project is to adapt Ukrainian counterparts of government portals to the English language version, aiming to professionalize international cooperation (as all information desired by investors is currently available only in Ukrainian).

Goals of the Industrial Alliance between Ukraine and the European Union

Anna Burkowicz, an expert from the Department of Mineral Resources Economy at the State Academy of Sciences’ Policy Laboratory, explained that Ukraine’s plans for cooperation with the European Union also involve rare earth metals, which have extensive potential applications. Rare earth metals, also called rare earth elements (REE) are a family of 17 chemical elements, including two scandium group elements (scandium and yttrium) and all lanthanides (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium). They occur in minerals and possess similar chemical properties. Due to their catalytic properties, they have numerous applications, including the petrochemical industry. Lanthanum and cerium, in particular, are widely used in the refining of crude oil for gasoline production.

Examples of applications for rare-earth elements (according to Wikipedia):

Scandium: alloys for aerospace and space industry

Yttrium: phosphors, ceramics, alloys

Lanthanum: batteries, X-ray films, catalysts in oil refining processes

Cerium: catalysts, alloys

Praseodymium: minor component in alloys used for magnets (corrosion prevention)

Neodymium: strong neodymium magnets, lasers

Promethium: beta radiation source

Samarium: magnets for high-temperature operation, control rods in reactors

Europium: liquid crystal displays, fluorescent lighting

Gadolinium: production of green phosphors in CRT screens and scintillators in X-ray imaging

Terbium: phosphors for lamps and displays

Dysprosium: strong magnets, lasers

Holmium: strong magnets

Erbium: lasers, optical amplifiers

Thulium: ceramic magnetic materials

Ytterbium: optical fibers, solar cell plates

Lutetium: x-ray-luminophores

In the United States, approximately 60% of lanthanides are used in refining, but REEs are utilized in a wide range of industries. These include ceramics, glazes, metallurgical alloys, rocketry, aviation, modern technologies, the IT sector, screens, lasers, diodes, the energy industry, and permanent magnets. The People’s Republic of China is responsible for 93% of the world’s production of all permanent magnets using rare earth metals, while Japan accounts for 6%, and the European Union for 1%.

The possibility of ending China’s monopoly for the moment is not realistic. According to participants in the roundtable discussion, unfortunately, the world’s economies themselves are responsible for the current state of the raw material market division, since the Chinese have built their current advantage de facto over the past several years. China naturally also has a huge raw material potential. In this context, the chance to return to European production may be provided by the very beginning of exploration of deposits in Ukraine.

Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation in the mining industry?

According to the opinion of Roman Dryps, the Chief Operating Officer of the Business Advisory Center of the Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce, which has been operating as a bilateral chamber for 30 years, the Polish government or Polish companies are unlikely to be Ukraine’s partners in the mining and processing of rare earth metals. Poland lacks the technology and the deposits themselves. There are only a few domestic enterprises that could be significant players in this area, including the already mentioned KGHM Polska Miedź SA and LW Bogdanka. According to the expert, Polish entrepreneurs working in the mining industry have had success in the field of new technologies, but mainly in the market of coal, liquid fuels, or gas extraction. Two main minerals, that were extracted in Ukraine until 2014 are coal and iron ore. The cycle of operation was simple – they were used for steel production or for energy purposes. At that time, most coal mines operated on a concession basis. The concessionaires of these mines were mostly owners of private machinery industry plants for mining machinery construction. Profit was simply the absolute priority at that time, and new technologies in the mining industry were not developed. The Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce actively collaborates with the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy, and based on unofficial information from “first-hand sources,” it is known that the coal mining industry will not be restored in the classic sense after the war. Furthermore, based on data presenting the resources on the territory of Ukraine, it can be learned that as of spring 2023, 63% of coal deposits, 11% of oil deposits, 20% of natural gas, 42% of metals, and 33% of rare earth metals were under the occupation of the Russian aggressor. Their overall value, according to geological studies, is estimated at 12.5 trillion US dollars. Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Ukraine’s natural resources could be a dominant factor that prompted Russia to launch a military attack.

Sources of financing of mining industry in Ukraine

The European Union (EU) has only recently begun working on support programs for investors to encourage them to invest capital in the development of advanced extractive and processing industries, particularly in the context of critical raw materials. So far, only recommendations have been issued at the EU level, regarding environmental decision-making related to the assessment of projects and concessions for the mining of rare earth metals. At the same time, it is likely that whether with the participation of EU programs, or even if there were none, or if they were insufficient, (assuming that the demand for these raw materials will grow, and thus, in the absence of supply), the price of these raw materials will increase and the profitability of these projects will also increase exponentially. This opens up the opportunity to obtain bank financing from European institutions in a situation where the elements in question are identified by the EU as key in the green transition and fit in with the requirements of sustainable development, or ESG strategies.

The Ukrainian public administration is currently undergoing a period of increased digitization, with a significant portion of public affairs being handled electronically. This will undoubtedly facilitate dialogue regarding potential financing and project cooperation as well.

Collaboration with the world of science

Scientists from the Polish Academy of Sciences utilize a wide range of literature in their studies on rare earth metals and stay up to date with the geopolitical situation regarding mineral resource economy worldwide. There is a possibility of assisting entrepreneurs in market research and identifying potential avenues of operation. So far, no Polish company has applied for a concession to operate in the Ukrainian market, which holds immense potential. In Poland, there are universities that educate mining engineers, metallurgists, and technologists.

By observing the specific nature of the mineral resource market, one can notice a decline in the trade of low-processed raw materials. For example, in the case of iron ore, concentrates are produced, and there are also technological changes occurring, with developed sintering and granulation processes for these ores. It is no longer bulk ore that would be transported over significant distances. With the next generation of resources, processing is increasingly concentrated in one place. In the case of rare earth metals, Chinese companies generate approximately 60% of global production, but their real advantage lies in processing, specifically separation. The ore is complex, consisting of several coexisting elements, usually around 7 to 8 types. China has specialized in individually extracting 7 to 8 minerals, rather than processing them comprehensively. In this situation, China has a monopoly in production, offering separated oxides and specific metals in the form of powders or semi-finished products worldwide. Recognizing the potential associated with deposit extraction in Ukraine, it can be observed that its owner, the State, should endeavor to establish comprehensive processing and ore extraction plants. However, this would not have significant implications due to China’s dominant position in the market. In Europe, at best, a concentrate could be produced, which would still need to be sent to China for further processing. China also holds a monopoly in battery and photovoltaic production due to low production costs. This has been the main reason for relocating facilities from the United States and Western Europe to China. Twenty years ago, the People’s Republic of China specialized in only a few resources. Now there are dozens, including those considered critical. Therefore, Ukraine certainly has potential, but parallel planning for the local processing and production market should be considered. In this context, collaboration with research and development is necessary.

Would synthetic elements be a solution?

Synthetic crystals such as silicon, sapphires, or synthetic diamonds are produced using the method developed by the Polish scientist, Professor Jan Czochralski. Synthetic products can serve as substitutes for natural ones. Synthetic diamonds, for example, are widely used in the abrasive and drilling industries. Materials engineering is rapidly advancing, and in this field, there is a vast potential for collaborative research that can contribute to the future reduction in the use of natural resources. Mining production may be minimized in the future. New composite materials are being discovered that have comparable strength to steel, but do not contain metal in their structure. One such example is the indium tin oxide alloy (ITO) used in touch screens. Indium used in production is not sourced from its own deposits. Therefore, if there is a forecasted increase in demand for this material, the mining process will need to be accelerated and expanded from the ore it is derived from. Forecasts related to the implementation of the Fit for 55 program suggest that demand for certain minerals may increase 50-fold. Some deposits will be depleted, making it impossible to meet the demand for certain elements. This opens up opportunities for the development of alternatives.

 

See more: 17.07.2023 Memorandum ZPP: “Ukraine’s Resource Policy – Strategic Resources and Rare Earth Metals”

 

Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers on the Cable Pooling Act

Warsaw, 30th May 2023

 

Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers on the Cable Pooling Act

 

While the Cable Pooling Act is a key decision in terms of development with regard to the Polish renewable energy sector, in its current form it remains unattractive:

  • energy from a hybrid installation in cable pooling will be cheaper than from a single RES source,
  • the role to be played by energy storage in cable pooling is significant, provided that energy storage is not treated as a generation source,
  • there is a risk of overregulation of connection sharing rules by generators, which will limit the potential for the emergence of new RES sources.

Presently, connecting new generation capacities to the National Power System is a considerable problem for the Polish energy sector as its reconstruction is both costly and time-consuming. A quick fix to this dilemma (at least to a certain extent) may be the shared use of a connection by renewable sources with different operating times and dynamics. By sharing such a connection, we get a more stable generation profile, which is desirable for the system. Unfortunately, the idea, without proper consultation, may easily turn into a useless regulation.

Proposals for amendments to the Energy Law presented by the Ministry of Climate regarding the so-called cable pooling constitute one of three key solutions for RES-related issues, critical for rapid development of RES in Poland, at an optimal investment cost.

Cable pooling is the possibility of using an already existing connection point, such as a wind farm, by another source, provided that the output power of such a hybrid power plant does not exceed the installed power allocated by the operator in the power connection agreement.

What does it mean in practice? If we have a wind farm with an installed capacity of 50 MW, this is the exact maximum value of energy that we can introduce energy into the system. Most days of the year, the wind farms operate at half of the installed capacity, in this case 25 MW, which means that there is still a possibility of introducing another 25 MW independently from the wind farm.

So, if we add 25 MW from a photovoltaic installation to those 25 MW from the windfarm, we will get a much more efficient source of green energy. Furthermore, the operating times of a wind farm and a solar installation usually do not coincide in time, usually the wind blows stronger at night, and the photovoltaic installation works more efficiently during the day.

If we supplement such a hybrid installation with a gas source with a capacity of about 10 MW and replace it in the future with a hydrogen installation, we will have a local, stable source of energy operating continuously with a fairly steady power for at least 7,500 hours a year.

Such an installation will generate approx. 250,000 MWh of energy per year, of which about 170,000 MWh will be green.

At no time will the energy introduced into the grid exceed 50 MW of power, so there will be no need to modernise the connection to add further sources. And this is a significant saving when planning a new investment, thanks to which the energy from such a hybrid system will be significantly cheaper than with a single energy source.

Proper provisions in the amendment to the Energy Law regarding cable pooling will enable a quick construction of at least 5-7 GW of solar and wind energy sources in Poland without the need for investors to wait for connection decisions, without overloading the power system. On a national scale, this could provide up to 12 TWh of cheap green energy. Some studies indicate that the potential of cable pooling in Poland is much larger, even at the level of 25 GW of new capacity.

Without focusing on individual provisions of the Act, which still require some fine-tuning, the initiative of the Ministry itself should be evaluated positively.

It is also a decision that significantly increases the energy security of the country, because one should expect quick investments in new sources that will supplement the existing ones, and at the local level will ensure an adequate supply of green energy for local industry.

Unfortunately, a fairly clearly identified threat during consultations regarding cable pooling regulations, led by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, is the overregulation of the new legal institution.

Technical and regulatory requirements for each single element of the system (aimed at increasing the control of the Energy Regulatory Office (URE) or Polish Power Grids (PSE) over each generation source), in confrontation with the joint and several liability of a group of entities organised under one cable pooling decision, will cause both problems in controlling the generation capacity of individual energy sources and a lack of freedom to shape relationships within the manufacturing group. Moreover, there is a risk of dilution of responsibility within the group, for example, for exceeding the contractual capacity.

At the present stage, the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has not yet indicated what cable pooling really is and what it is intended to be. Such assumptions would allow for self-discipline in drafting regulations and would limit the risk of their excessive detail, which currently makes the new law extremely difficult to enforce. The complexity of regulations may therefore cause cable pooling to be an option selected only by large energy players or investment groups that are not energy companies, but may block the development of cable pooling and try to monopolise connections.

In order to ensure that the Cable Pooling Act is widely implemented:

  • remove from the act any and all provisions that go beyond metering, power control, and control of line overshoots,
  • leave the broadly understood principle of freedom to conclude contracts between RES producers who are parties to a cable pooling contract,
  • the need to control and the obligation to report generation from each source is rational, but control of each of them should remain the responsibility of business entities, and not state authorities or institutions (in this case, the supervising entity would encroach on the principle of freedom to shape contractual relations),
  • public authorities or institutions should only have at their disposal controllability of a power source as a whole solely at the connection point, and not of each generating device. Otherwise, it will disrupt business relations within the group and may become the source of civil lawsuits both against administrative authorities and between entities within said group,
  • entities other than those licenced should not be allowed to be parties to cable pooling agreements, so that they do not block or monopolise connections, while not being subject to provisions of the Energy Law (due to the energy security of the state and undesirable actions of third parties),
  • parties to the agreements (leaders of a potential joint venture) should only be entities that supply energy at a given connection point or are a licenced applicant for connection to the network,
  • the basis of the operation of cable pooling is the stability and predictability of accumulated energy sources introduced at the connection point. Entities that ensure controllability of the energy introduced in accordance with the power demand should be rewarded, promoted, and exempted from fees – this will encourage people to add energy storage to the pooling cable system (so that power control is more flexible and resembles generation from commercial energy sources),
  • energy storages operating within the cable pooling system should not be separated or treated as power generators, but together with another renewable source as one generation unit – assigned to a specific generating element.

 

See more: 30.05.2023 Commentary of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers on the Cable Pooling Act

Our report: CIT in Poland – why is it not as it should be?

Warsaw, 31st May 2023

 

ZPP report: CIT in Poland – why is it not as it should be?

 

The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers has published its latest report “CIT in Poland – why is it not as it should be?” which is an attempt to systematise the knowledge on the functioning of corporate income tax in Poland.

The year 2022 was exceptional in terms of the share of budget revenues from taxes. For the first time ever in history, CIT revenues (PLN 70.1 billion) exceeded those from PIT (PLN 68.1 billion) from natural persons. The shift in priority in relation to the value of the tax paid is an extraordinary situation resulting from the record-breaking – 33.9 percent y/y – increase in CIT revenues. In recent years, not only the amount of tax paid in nominal terms, but also in relation to GDP, was the highest in history.

However, the observable increase in CIT revenues did not bridge the gap in relation to this tax. Due to its often-elusive nature from an economic perspective, the size of the CIT gap is largely the result of the collected estimates. The Polish Economic Institute in their “CIT Gap in Poland” (“Luka w CIT”) report states that in 2019-2020 the level of the CIT gap stabilised at approx. 30% of theoretical CIT revenues. This means – recalling the suggestive picture outlined by PIE experts – that out of every PLN 100 of tax that should flow to the state budget and local governments, they receive only about PLN 70. According to estimates, the CIT gap in 2020 was between PLN 20 and 25 billion. Recent years have also been a period of dynamic changes regarding the scale of the phenomenon.

Therefore, the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers set itself the goal of systematising the latest available analytical knowledge concerning CIT, discussing the key phenomena related to this tax, identifying successes and failures in terms of reducing the scale of the phenomenon of aggressive tax optimisation and considering the reasonableness of alternative concepts – with the entire repository of opportunities and risks correlated with it.

The “CIT in Poland – why is it not as it should be?” report was created as part of the Business for Poland, Poland for Business project.

 

Find out more: 31.05.2023 CIT report in Poland. Why is it not as it should be?

Press conference: Marcin Nowacki elected the EU’s head of the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform

Warsaw, 29th May 2023

 

Press conference:
Marcin Nowacki elected the EU’s head of the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform

 

On 29th May 2023 at 1 pm, at the Polish seat of the European Parliament and the European Commission, a press conference was held during which Marcin Nowacki, Vice-President of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, was elected head of EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform (EU-Ukraine CSP) representing the European Union. The platform operates within the framework of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in Brussels, which is an EU advisory body.

At the conference, Cezary Kaźmierczak, President of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, pointed out during his opening address that the European Economic and Social Committee is a platform for dialogue between employers, trade unions, NGOs, and politicians: “We are truly happy that a Pole has become the plenipotentiary for Ukrainian affairs, even more so a member of our organisation. Marcin Nowacki took on his new duties already at the beginning of the month.”

“The EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform is the foundation of institutional cooperation between social partners from EU member states and Ukraine. I have been elected for a term of 2.5 years, and I hope that we will soon begin the accession negotiation process. This is what will motivate me the most in the months to come. After the negotiations start, the Civil Society Platform will become the EU-Ukraine Joint Consultative Committee,” – said Marcin Nowacki, the Union’s VP.

The EU-Ukraine CSP integrates social partners from the EU and Ukraine. The body aims to supervise the process of Ukraine’s integration with the EU and to integrate the business community and employees between the parties. As part of the undertaken activities, reviews of the process of adapting Ukraine to EU requirements and support in the field of Ukrainian business entering the EU market are held.

The EESC is an EU advisory body with a specific role in the EU’s decision-making process. Before being processed by the European Parliament, each regulation is subject to an opinion process at the EESC. It consists of 329 representatives of employers’ organisations, trade unions, and NGOs from all Member States.

ZPP’s comment: Poland – a good place for Ukrainian entrepreneurship

Warsaw, June 14, 2023

 

ZPP’s comment: Poland – a good place for Ukrainian entrepreneurship

 

  • According to data from Info Credit, Ukrainians established 17,457 business activities in Poland in 2022.
  • Only from the beginning of 2023 up to May 29 (inclusive), 13,117 business activities run by Ukrainian citizens were registered in Poland.
  • Since the beginning of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainians have established the largest number of business activities in Mazovia and Lower Silesia.
  • As of early 2022, Ukrainians were most likely to locate their companies in Warsaw, Krakow and Wrocław.
  • The number of companies established by Ukrainians in Poland has been significantly influenced by the Special Act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens.

Border Guard estimates show that 12 million Ukrainian refugees have crossed the border with Poland since the beginning of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. In the period of February 24–28, 2022 alone, it was 355,000 people. Migration peaked in March 2022, when approx. 2 million Ukrainians entered Poland. Between April 2022 and the end of May 2023, Polish-Ukrainian border crossings were crossed by 584,000 people in February 2023 to as many as 781,000 people in August 2022. Obviously, not all of these people remained in Poland, but the vast majority nevertheless decided to settle in our country. A significant group are those who have taken up legal permanent gainful employment in Poland or decided to establish a business activity. According to estimates by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, approx. 97 percent of Ukrainian refugees are women (most men are banned from crossing the state border).

Business activity of Ukrainians in Poland in 2022

The definite influx of Ukrainians into Poland has translated into a huge increase in the dynamics of Ukrainians starting businesses. Data from Info Credit shows that in 2022 Ukrainians established 17,457 business activities in Poland, of which 14,258 companies were active at the end of the calendar year. 1,191 business activities were deleted and 1,781 suspended.

Ukrainians were most active in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, where they established 4,256 companies last year. The second place was taken by the Dolnośląskie Voivodeship, where 2,673 Ukrainian businesses were established. The following voivodeships were ranked next: Małopolskie – 2,285 companies, Pomorskie – 1828, Wielkopolskie – 1,361, Zachodniopomorskie – 1,029, Śląskie – 979, Łódzkie – 687, Lubuskie – 520, Kujawsko-Pomorskie – 417, Podkarpackie – 357, Opolskie – 296, Warmińsko-Mazurskie – 118, Świętokrzyskie – 114 and Podlaskie 91.

Ukrainians registered the largest number of companies in 2022 in Warsaw – 3,289. Many were also established in Krakow – 1,899, Wrocław – 1,873, Poznań – 840, Gdańsk – 835, Szczecin – 655 and Łódź – 484.

Relatively constant over the years has been the group of major PKD codes indicated by Ukrainians within their business activities. Hairdressing and other beauty treatment led the way in 2022, with 2,144 indicated as the main PKD code. The second most frequently indicated type of activity was computer programming activities (1,995 companies), and the third was other building completion and finishing (1,243 companies). Significantly popular in 2022 were also (in parentheses the number of indications as the main PKD code): construction related to erection of residential and non-residential buildings (764), electrical installation (540), freight transport by road (533), mechanical working of metal elements (420), retail sale via mail order houses or via the Internet (383), restaurants and other eating places (376) and other specialized construction activities not elsewhere classified (372).

Business activity of Ukrainian citizens in Poland in 2023

A definite upturn in the establishment of companies by Ukrainian citizens came in 2023. Data from Info Credit shows that 13,117 such businesses were registered between January 1 and May 29, 2023 alone. Active during the indicated period remained 11,694 of them – 421 were suspended and 170 were deleted. There were 51 enterprises operating exclusively in the form of a company, and 3 with the end of the indicated period were waiting to start operations.

The largest number of new business activities established by Ukrainian citizens between January 2023 and May 29, 2023 were registered in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship – 3,211, Dolnośląskie Voivodeship – 1,941 and Małopolskie Voivodeship – 1,793. The following voivodeships ranked next: Pomorskie – 1,285 companies, Wielkopolskie – 993 companies, Zachodniopomorskie and Śląskie – 772 companies, Lubuskie – 507, Łódzkie- 492, Kujawsko-Pomorskie – 333, Podkarpackie – 305, Lubelskie – 260, Opolskie – 182, Świętokrzyskie – 102, Warmińsko-Mazurskie – 98 and Podlaskie – 61.

Also in 2023 (up to and including May 29), Ukrainians were eager to register their businesses within Poland’s largest metropolises. 2,500 companies were established in Warsaw, 1,549 in Krakow, 1,386 in Wrocław, 665 in Gdańsk, 591 in Poznań, 472 in Szczecin and 350 in Łódź.

In the period from the beginning of 2023 to May 29, 2023 inclusive, the main PKD codes most frequently indicated by companies established by Ukrainian citizens were: computer programming activities (2,100 times), hairdressing and other beauty treatment (1,461), other building completion and finishing (817), construction related to erection of residential and non-residential buildings (549), freight transport by road (453), electrical installation (442), mechanical working of metal elements (365), restaurants and other eating places (335), retail sales via mail order houses or via the Internet (315) and other specialized construction activities not elsewhere classified (291).

Poland is a natural migration destination for citizens from Ukraine plunged into war. Domestic legislation also favors the development of Ukrainian entrepreneurship in the Polish market. Of essential importance in this regard is the Special Act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, which has contributed to a revival in the registration of sole proprietorships by Ukrainian men and women.

 

See more: 14.06.2023 ZPP’s comment: Poland – a good place for Ukrainian entrepreneurship

 

In order to ensure the development of SMR technology in Poland and Europe, we need fleet-oriented investments of regional coverage

Warsaw, 13 June 2023 

 

In order to ensure the development of SMR technology in Poland and Europe, we need fleet-oriented investments of regional coverage

 

That’s the conclusion of a discussion among industry experts, technology providers, investors and researchers who attended the “SMR – Modular Nuclear Energy for Business” conference on Monday, June 12, held in Warsaw by the Energy and Climate Forum of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers. PKN ORLEN was the Main Partner of the event, EDF was a Partner, and Honorary Patrons included three ministries – the Ministry of Climate and Environment, the Ministry of Development and Technology and the Ministry of State Assets, as well as the National Atomic Energy Agency, the National Center for Nuclear Research and the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management.

The event brought together both nuclear lawmakers, the regulator, several US and European SMR manufacturers, recipients declaring interest in small reactors of various capacities and nuclear experts, who sought to take prepare an inventory of the state of the art of modular nuclear reactors to date and outline the outlook for the development of such investments in our country and region.

In the opinion of Adam Guibourgé-Czetwertyński, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Climate and Environment, the Polish nuclear special-purpose act and nuclear law are sufficient for SMR investments to be developed on their basis, with technology neutrality and a desire to streamline the processes involved in obtaining the necessary permits at the core of the national legislation. Nonetheless, seeing the growing interest in small nuclear reactors, work is currently underway at the ministry to detail regulations for smaller modular nuclear reactors. The minister also encouraged a concerted international effort to bring nuclear technologies from a background player to the front lines of energy transition efforts – as complementary solutions to RES and hydrogen investments.

According to Kamila Król, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Development and Technology, small nuclear reactors have the potential to become a lever of the Polish economy in the coming decades. SMRs can be a remedy for the rising cost of CO2 allowances and ensure Poland has the right composition of the low-carbon energy mix on the one hand, and guarantee a stable and secure energy supply on the other.

As noted by Jarosław Dybowski, Executive Director of Energy PKN ORLEN and Vice Chairman of the Board of ORLEN Synthos Green Energy: “We cannot think of nuclear reactors today as classically understood power plants, which in the past were only meant to provide electricity. The use of SMRs in domestic conditions is naturally the replacement of depleted coal-fired units, but the modular reactors will also work in the combined heat and power economy and find application in numerous industrial processes.” District heating and energy-intensive industries are identified as the main beneficiaries of SMR technologies, and the number of entities declaring interest in these solutions is growing.

The main challenge appears to be not so much the technology of light-water nuclear reactors themselves, of which there are about 150 in operation worldwide and only their power and size need to be scaled up; it is the cost that may be a barrier. Experts agree that two aspects can help investors in this regard. On the one hand, suitable government guarantees and a refined financial model, so that involvement in SMRs for banks entails acceptable risks. On the other, the economies of scale brought about by a fleet-oriented investment campaign of regional range, which will reduce unit costs and build locally the competence, service facilities and structures necessary for the new sector.

“After listening to the participants of the discussion, several recommendations come to mind, such as the involvement of Polish regulators in work on harmonizing nuclear regulations and standardizing certification of SMRs in Europe, the need to consider establishing a TSO (Technical Support Organization) within the structures of the National Center for Nuclear Research and, finally, opening a debate on the future of the nuclear energy in the EU taxonomy, which assumes support for nuclear investments only until 2045, at the European forum.” – concluded Jakub Bińkowski, Board Member of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers.

The conference also touched upon many other aspects of SMR projects, such as safety considerations and the important role of the PPA, which will evaluate small nuclear on the same basis as full-scale nuclear investments. According to experts – despite the already clear support for nuclear in Poland – an extremely important aspect determining the success of SMR investments will be properly conducted communication due to the particular public perception of risk from nuclear facilities. As experts point out, there is no shortage of ideas for small nuclear reactors in the world today, as there are already about 80 projects at the “early design” stage, including also high-temperature reactors using other types of fuel and cooled by gas, HTRs (including a Polish one!) or nuclear batteries that can operate for 20 years without human intervention and the need for fuel supply. Another thread raised by the participants in the discussion was the possibility of involving Polish companies in the development of the European SMR sector, in which experts see significant potential given the pace of development of SMR projects in our country.

The event was attended by over 150 participants. The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers will soon make a full recording of the conference available on its YouTube channel.

Link to the event page: https://zpp.net.pl/en/events/event/conference-smr-small-reactors-for-business-is-poland-the-smr-technology-incubator-in-europe/

 

“Network fees” proposed by telecommunications operators – will consumers pay twice for infrastructure maintenance?

Warsaw, 15 May 2023

 

 

“Network fees” proposed by telecommunications operators – will consumers pay twice for infrastructure maintenance?

 

  1. Recommendations

Over the past months there has been an increased discussion regarding ETNO’s (European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association – representing the biggest telecommunications companies) demands to charge content and application providers for the traffic that is generated by the use of their services. Telecoms believe that because of them they are being forced to bear the costs of infrastructure maintenance, and call content providers “stowaways” who do not contribute to the maintenance of European infrastructure. The truth, however, is quite different, and this is not a fight between telecoms and the big Internet giants, but a fight for the Internet as we know it. The concept of “fairshare payments,” as telecoms call them, is opposed by virtually all circles, except the largest Internet providers. Their introduction will certainly also be felt by Polish digital companies, which employ thousands of people and contribute greatly to the economy. 

In this paper, we will present where the idea of introducing “fair share payments” came from and how it is argued. We will also present what effects the implementation of this solution will have on consumers and entrepreneurs, and we will present individual national circumstances.

In view of the ongoing debate on the introduction of “fair share payments” we note the following:

  • Not even the telecoms themselves agree on the cost of handling Internet traffic. The Fédération Française des Télécoms presented an estimate according to which handling network traffic generates €2 billion in costs in France, or €27 for each resident of the country. That’s a third of the amount of €80 per EU resident calculated by ETNO, and it’s still significantly inflated.
  • The research indicates that South Korea is so far the only country that has responded to the concerns of telecoms and introduced the legal billing rule of Spending Party Network Pays (SPNP). Under the rules, Internet content and application providers have been required to pay fees to telecoms. The report’s conclusions are clear. All of these regulations have led to a reduction in the quality and variety of content on the Internet. It is also expected to increase costs for the end user of content and reduce investment in local infrastructure
  • Fair share payments can lead to a deterioration in the quality of online content offered by providers. Additional fees mean a reduction in budgets for creating quality services offered to consumers.
  • The introduction of additional fees will lead to a competitive imbalance in the telecom market itself favoring the largest players. They will lead in practice to the strengthening of oligopolies in the market.
  • Fair share payments are widely criticized by almost all circles except the largest telecoms. Experts point out that among the numerous disadvantages of this solution, the most noteworthy is the violation of the principle of Internet neutrality.
  • In Poland, the expansion of Internet infrastructure is carried out with massive public funding. This means that this purpose is financed by all taxpayers. One can point, among others, to the information contained in the “Broadband Access Plan for Poland,” according to which in the Digital Poland Operational Program for 2014-2020, out of the total funds amounting to 2.57 billion euros, over a billion was allocated to the expansion of broadband networks.

In view of the above, we urge to reject the idea of introducing “fair share payments” within the European Union.

  1. Proposals to introduce so-called “fair share payments”.

For nearly a year there has been a discussion on the idea of introducing so-called “fair share payments”. This idea was presented by Commissioner Vestager on May 2, 2022[1]. Unfortunately, all indications are that the European Commission is seriously considering the introduction of fair share payments for Internet content and application providers. The issue is being highlighted as a dispute between two big industries, Internet access providers (telecoms) and big Internet corporations. The issue has come to the fore through ETNO’sactivities , which is extensively lobbying for the introduction of fees for “extraordinary growth in Internet traffic that generates challenges for sustainable investment in the European network.” This position is supported among others by Deutsche Telecom, Orange, Telefonica and Telecom Italia, claiming that the six largest Internet content providers account for more than half of Internet traffic[2]. The argument, in a nutshell, is that large US corporations generate heavy network loads by offering their content, and this leads to the need for large infrastructure expenditures. This traffic is generated by the popularization of streaming, teleconferencing, remote learning, social media, and cloud services. Telecoms assume that since annual network maintenance in 2020 cost €52.5 billion, and service and application providers account for 60-70% of Internet traffic, they should pay €36 billion (€80 per EU resident) to telecoms. Moreover, this amount should increase every year due to the growth of network traffic[3].

However, the telecoms’ argument is fraught with a number of significant problems. First of all, telecoms charge consumers themselves for internet use. Their demands on service and application providers are nothing more than a demand for a second fee for the same service.

This relationship is illustrated by the graph below:

Telecoms make their infrastructure available to consumers. Consumers use internet content offered by service providers and applications, and this generates traffic on the network. As the use of content available on the Internet generates traffic, telecoms have decided to demand an additional fee from service and application providers called “fair share payment.”.

What is also worth noting is that telecoms argue for their demands with the need to maintain the network due to increased traffic (load). Meanwhile, telecoms’ investments consist of relay stations, fiber optics, modems, and data centers, among other things. A large cost is, for example, the construction of masts and fiber-optic networks. Nevertheless, 70-80% of the total telecom costs are spent precisely on infrastructure, which lasts and can be successfully used for at least 30 years. The remainder relates outdated equipment, which should be upgraded every 5-10 years. The cost of “network maintenance” due to high traffic is therefore not high, and this is explicitly admitted by some telecoms. The Fédération Française des Télécoms presented an estimate according to which handling network traffic generates 2 billion euros in costs in France, or 27 euros for each resident of the country. That’s a third of the amount of €80 per EU resident calculated by ETNO, and it’s still significantly inflated.  In France, you can easily find consumer offers of 10 gigabit-per-second connections along with phone and TV at prices around 30-49 euros per month[4]. These package offers are also a great example of existing interrelations and co-dependencies between telecommunications operators and service providers. In Poland, Orange offers fiber optics with 1 Gbps download speeds for 17.5 euros per month[5]. It is also worth citing an example in which one German student accommodation organization wanted to provide students with Internet access at a speed of at least 1 Gbps at all times in 2020. The offer for such access was made by 8 German telecoms, of which 5 offered the amount of 11 euros per month per student[6]. These examples indicate market prices for Internet access, no Internet provider would bid below its costs. Hence, the calculations of both ETNO and the Fédération Française des Télécoms are clearly inflated.  It is also difficult to argue that internet platforms are “free riders” because they have invested billions in the construction and development of internet infrastructure over the last decade.

  1. Effects of “fair share” fees on citizens and businesses.

A fee similar to “fair share payments” has been introduced in South Korea, and this is basically the only case where we can find similarities with existing solutions. The Korean example has been studied by BEUC (The European Consumer Organization), among others. It cited a study commissioned by the German Federal Internet Agency. The research indicates that South Korea is so far the only country that has responded to the concerns of telecoms and introduced the legal billing rule of Sending Party Network Pays (SPNP). Under the rules, Internet content and application providers have been required to pay fees to telecoms. The report’s conclusions are clear. All of these regulations have led to a reduction in the quality and variety of content on the Internet. It is also expected to increase costs for the end user of content and reduce investment in local infrastructure[7].

A similar view is held by the European Internet Exchange Association, which, analyzing, among other things, the situation in South Korea, points out that “fair share payments” are detrimental to the proper functioning of the Internet communications and peering market and distort competition in this market. In addition, they will negatively affect the experience of citizens in basic business operations, data sharing, access to cloud services and the development of research projects[8] .

Paradoxically, therefore, “fair share” fees in Korea have had exactly the opposite effect of the one that telecoms claim they were intended to serve. It should be pointed out that the introduction of additional fees on Internet content providers could force them to introduce at least partial payment for their services, which were previously free. This could reduce access to online content and lead to digital exclusion of less affluent Internet users. This straightforwardly violates the principle of Internet neutrality, which, however, by definition says that it is the ability of all Internet users to access selected content and applications.

Another issue is the reduction in the quality of content available online. Clearly, many companies offering, for example, streaming services, access to online TV or other video content will be affected by such fees. Prices for access to content can be introduced here or raised only up to a certain level, above which consumers will not be able to accept additional fees. In practice, it will be impossible to pass on the entire cost to content consumers. This means a smaller budget for the creation of quality online content. Similar concerns are presented, among others, by the European Association of Commercial Television and VoD Services, which has issued an open letter expressing concern on the introduction of network fees and its’ effects on the European creative industry[9]

Crucially, the dispute over “fair share payments” should not be viewed as a conflict between big telecom companies and big Internet corporations. These fees have the potential to very seriously undermine competition on the Internet and threaten the smallest entrepreneurs. Such concerns are presented by the French Association of Alternative Telecom Operators, among others, which notes that fees of this kind will be fatal to the survival of small and medium-sized digital companies[10]. Small companies offering content on the Internet will be put in a very difficult position, as on the one hand they will be charged for Internet traffic, and on the other hand it will be difficult for them to pass this cost on to consumers. The introduction of fees to offset the cost of “fair share” fees will make them lose their competitiveness with larger players in the market. 

What’s more, smaller telecom service companies are also openly criticizing the idea of fees. Such threats are pointed out by both MVNO Europe and the EU Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA). They point out that the fees will cause serious damage to competition in the telecom market, will directly affect smaller operators, and will negatively impact both individual consumers and telecom customer companies. The fees will only benefit the largest players in the market by strengthening their oligopolies[11] .

“Fair share payments” are also criticized by academics. In October 2022, they sent a letter to the European Commission signed by 29 market experts, PhDs and professors who know the market very well. They pointed out that the proposal to charge Internet service providers and applications is not new and has always been rejected as harmful. They point out that for the past decade the idea has been unequivocally criticized by experts, business and NGOs. The experts point out in their letter that in 2015[12], the EU granted internet users the right to freely access information and content, use and deliver applications and services of their choice. EU standards require broadband service providers to treat data in a non-discriminatory manner, regardless of what it contains, what application transmits the data, where it comes from and to whom it is directed. Even if fair share payments were directed only to the largest Internet content providers, this would still directly violate open Internet access standards.

Experts also point out that broadband networks are an important part of the value chain just as Internet content providers are driving demand from Europeans for access to the Web. Broadband providers gain significant benefits from the fact that service providers generate demand for broadband access. In doing so, telecoms pay nothing for the efforts of Internet content and application providers in creating that demand. Without the demand generated by Internet content providers, telecoms would not have many customers for high-speed Internet access services. Customers who, after all, pay telecoms for that access. Moreover, governments, universities, government offices and other public entities are also Internet content providers. All of these entities are already paying for the development of Internet networks. The researchers also explicitly point out that history and economic theory indicate that similar fees will not increase investment in Internet infrastructure by telecoms[13].

The European Video on Demand Coalition is also opposed to “fair share payments,” pointing out that the introduction of this fee will harm the development of innovation in Europe and the digitization process. They also express concern that proposals of this kind are being put forward without adequate public consultation and analysis of the impact of such solutions[14]. Germany’s VAUNET argues that fees threaten media pluralism and the quality of content[15], while the Association of Commercial Television points out that Internet access fees for content providers mean less money for content creation. Which will ultimately lead to less or lower quality content[16].

Finally, it should be noted that on June 8, 2022. 34 social organizations from 17 countries sent an open letter to Commissioners Vestager and Breton pointing out the problems cited above and opposing the introduction of “fair share payments.” The authors of the letter emphasize that the Commissioner’s statement about players generating a lot of Internet traffic who should be charged a fair fee to telecoms shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Internet works[17].

So it turns out that both businesses (including smaller telecoms), social organizations, industry organizations and academia speak with one voice and strongly oppose the idea of “fair share payments” stressing that it is harmful to the entire market. The only entities that will gain from it are the largest telecoms, which are actively lobbying the solution at the European Commission.

  1. Polish market

The value of the Polish telecommunications market is 40.8 billion Polish zlotys (approximately 8.73 billion euros). Telecommunications investments in 2020 amounted to 8.9 billion Polish zlotys (approximately 1.95 billion euros). As many as 66.6% of broadband internet users have a connection with a bandwidth of at least 100 Mbps, and estimates indicate that by 2026, over 80% of mobile internet users will have access to 5G technology[18].

According to a survey conducted by the Office of Electronic Communications on a sample of 2011 people aged 15 and over, 97.2% of people in our country use mobile phones, 54.9% use mobile internet, and 54.1% use stationary internet. Any kind of internet access was declared by 79.1% of the respondents. The average monthly bill for stationary internet is 59.17 zlotys (just under 13 euros), while for mobile internet it is 46.43 zlotys (approximately 10 euros)[19]. Poland ranks 30th in the Speedtest Global Index for broadband internet access speed, with an average speed of 106.40 Mbps, and 44th for mobile internet with a speed of 47.86 Mbps[20]. Therefore, the internet in Poland is relatively fast and inexpensive.

Providing fast internet at a relatively low cost, of course, requires investment in infrastructure. However, in Poland, a number of such tasks are undertaken from public funds and do not cost telecom companies a penny. One can point, among others, to the information contained in the “Broadband Access Plan for Poland,” according to which in the Digital Poland Operational Program for 2014-2020, out of the total funds amounting to 2.57 billion euros, over a billion was allocated to the expansion of broadband networks[21]. Further expenditures are planned in the program for 2021-2027. The entire 2 billion euros is to be allocated, among other things, to ensure access to broadband internet with a speed of at least 100 Mbps in every household and business and with a speed of at least 1 Gbps in every place that is significant in terms of social and economic aspects, such as schools, hospitals, offices, and technological and business centers[22]. In addition, funds for the expansion of internet infrastructure have also been planned in the Broadband Fund, which will finance investment projects worth a total of 20 million zlotys in the first call[23]. Further financing has also been planned in the National Recovery Plan. Formally, 21% of the budget is allocated for digitization-related projects, although Minister Plenipotentiary Paweł Lewandowski suggests that even over 30% of the NRP budget may be allocated to this purpose. By 2026, 931 thousand households are planned to be connected to broadband networks[24].

Taking into account the scale of public investments in expanding internet infrastructure, it is clear that the largest cost associated with the dissemination of fast internet in Poland has been to a large extent supported by public funding, mainly through funds from the EU. Similarly, in other countries, huge amounts of money from both the EU and national budgets are allocated for digital transformation. Therefore, telecom companies are not bearing these costs, but rather taxpayers. This means that big telecommunication companies are using infrastructure financed by all of us, burdening their customers with the costs of internet access, and now they are demanding “fair share payments” from content and internet application providers, which could result in significant changes to the internet as we know it, unfortunately only for the worse. Telecom companies will gain by receiving enormous amounts of money, while we will all lose.

In addition, other instruments such as the Broadband Fund are being prepared or already launched, and the development of telecommunications infrastructure is included in the National Recovery Plan.

Therefore, it is difficult to find rational reasons for additional funding of telecommunication operators’ budgets. Moreover, the adoption of the proposal on network fees may in practice lead to limiting access to certain platforms, which directly contradicts the principle of net neutrality.

***

[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/eus-vestager-assessing-if-tech-giants-should-sharetelecoms-network-costs-2022-05-02/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[2] https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-wants-details-big-tech-telcos-investment-plans-source-2023-01-10/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[3] https://www.project-disco.org/european-union/020123-fast-internet-doesnt-cost-eu-telecom-operatorsmuch-at-all/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[4] https://www.project-disco.org/european-union/020123-fast-internet-doesnt-cost-eu-telecom-operatorsmuch-at-all/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[5] https://oferty.orange.pl/swiatlowod2/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[6] https://www.project-disco.org/european-union/020123-fast-internet-doesnt-cost-eu-telecom-operatorsmuch-at-all/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[7] WIK-Consult report, Study for the Federal Network Agency Germany, Competitive conditions on transit and peering markets Implications for European digital sovereignty Final report.

[8] https://www.euro-ix.net/media/filer_public/c7/72/c772acf6-b286-4edb-a3c5042090e513df/spnp_impact_on_ixps_-_signed.pdf (dostęp na dzień 27.04.2023 r.).

[9] https://www.acte.be/publication/tv-vod-statement-on-network-fees/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[10] https://www.project-disco.org/european-union/020723-is-anyone-in-favour-of-taxing-internet-traffic/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[11] https://www.project-disco.org/european-union/020723-is-anyone-in-favour-of-taxing-internet-traffic/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[12] Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 25, 2015, Official Journal of the European Union L 310.

[13] https://www.komaitis.org/personal-blog/29-internet-experts-and-academics-send-a-letter-to-thecommission-urging-to-abandon-the-sending-party-network-pays-proposal (accessed April 27, 2023).

[14] https://www.europeanvodcoalition.com/positions/position-paper-on-net-neutrality/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[15] https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/02/VAUNET-positionpaper_NetworkFees.pdf (accessed April 27, 2023).

[16] https://www.acte.be/publication/tv-vod-statement-on-network-fees/ (accessed April 27, 2023).

[17] https://epicenter.works/sites/default/files/2022_06-nn-open_letter_cso_0.pdf (accessed April 27, 2023).

[18]https://www.telepolis.pl/images/2022/06/raport_o_stanie_rynku_telekomunikacyjnego_w_polsce_w_2021_r._30.06..pdf (accessed April 27, 2023).

[19] Office of Electronic Communications, Analysis of the functioning of the telecommunications services market in Poland and assessment of consumer preferences. 2022. Survey of individual customers.

[20] https://www.speedtest.net/global-index (accessed April 27, 2023).

[21] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/broadband-poland (accessed April 27, 2023).

[22] https://www.gov.pl/web/funds-regional-policy/nearly-2-billion-euros-for-polands-digital-transformation (accessed April 27, 2023).

[23] https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/fundusz-szerokopasmowy–pierwszy-nabor-wnioskow (accessed April 27, 2023).

[24] https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/internet-szerokopasmowy-rozwoj-sieci-budzet-kpo ; https://www.gov.pl/web/planodbudowy/transformacja-cyfrowa (accessed April 27, 2023).

 

See more: 15.05.2023 “Network fees” proposed by telecommunications – operators will consumers pay twice for infrastructure maintenance?

The role of RES in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine

Warsaw, 13 April 2023

The role of RES in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine

The following is a Memorandum summarising the debate that took place during the 3rd roundtable of the Energy and Climate Forum of Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, dedicated to the Ukrainian energy sector and implemented as part of the EUROPE-POLAND-UKRAINE REBUILD TOGETHER 2023 project, in cooperation with the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland.

Renewable energy development in Ukraine:

  • Over the last five years (prior to the war), Ukraine was able to attract approx. EUR 10 billion in investment in the renewable energy industry.
  • According to a 2019 assessment by Bloomberg, Ukraine ranked 8th out of 140 countries in terms of attractiveness for renewable energy investment.
  • In terms of the pace of green energy development, Ukraine was among the top 10 economies in the world in 2019 and was in the top 5 European countries in terms of solar energy development in 2020.
  • In the structure of electricity production before the war, renewable energy accounted for 8% of the overall energy balance.
  • Solar power plants accounted for ca. 58% of renewable energy, wind power plants generated 32%, biomass about 3%, hydropower plants approx. 2%, and biogas close to 5%.
  • Currently, over 50% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is damaged.
  • As a result of the war, wind power has suffered losses and damage to 90% of the entire infrastructure.
  • The share of renewable energy according to the “National Action Plan for Renewable Energy Development until 2030” and the “National Energy Strategy of Ukraine” should reach 25% by the year 2030.
  • Presently, Ukraine has surplus green energy production and is capable of energy exports.
  • The renewable energy industry in Ukraine is one of the few sectors that operated in a market-oriented and transparent manner even before the war.
  • The Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH) operates programmes to rebuild Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which Polish companies can participate in, and the funds can reach up to EUR 100-200 million.

The following esteemed guests attended the debate:

Prof. Alicja Chybicka – Senator of the Republic of Poland

Ivan Grygoruk – Vice President, Energy Club

Janusz Gajowiecki – President of the Polish Wind Energy Association

Igor Krechkevych – Technical Director of the Energy Efficiency Fund

Karol Kubica – Head of the Foreign Trade Office in Kyiv, Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH)

Konstantin Magaletskyi – Green Recovery Fund Ukraine

Olexander Podprugin – Member of the Board, Ukrainian Wind Energy Association and President of Elementum Energy

Anastasiia Vereshchynska – International Development Manager at Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation

Serhij Zasowienko – First Secretary of the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland

Moderators:

Dominika Taranko – Director of the Energy and Climate Forum, Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers

Hennadii Radchenko – Advisor, Ukraine Business Center, Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers

Current state of affairs of energy generation from renewable sources

The first person to be asked to speak was Ivan Hryhoruk, who discussed the current situation and pointed out that as of now more than 50% of Ukraine’s entire energy infrastructure has been damaged. Unfortunately, this also applies to renewable energy sources (RES), mainly photovoltaic and wind power. These were mostly located in areas where current or past military operations are taking place, as the largest number of solar and wind power plants were installed in the Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa regions. Some solar power plants survived and are still operational in certain locations, but most facilities were destroyed during military operations or were vandalised and looted. Wind energy production infrastructure was damaged by 90% compared to its per-war capacity. Power plants in central and western Ukraine are operating normally if the distribution network allows it. However, power sources in southern and eastern parts of Ukraine are severely limited. Overall, out of the installed capacity of 13 GW, only approx. 40% is currently in operation, and are experiencing serious limitations.

Plans regarding renewable energy production

In post-war conditions, the structure of energy production will change. Ukraine has opted for integration with the EU, and the national energy grid is being synchronised with the European one. The synchronisation processes are ongoing, and Ukraine is fulfilling all the commitments it has made regarding the development of RES in the energy balance structure. This trend will continue to develop. However, it will develop according to a slightly different concept, as significant relocation of production potential from the so-called “grey zone” to the western and central regions of Ukraine is taking place due to the war.

Structure of pre-war electricity production

Renewables accounted for 8% of the overall energy balance in electricity generation prior to the war. These were mainly large industrial power plants. Photovoltaic power plants accounted for around 58% of all energy produced from RES, wind power plants – 32%, biomass – approx. 3%, hydroelectric power plants – 2%, and biogas – ca. 5%. Total installed solar capacity amounted to almost 7 GW, while installed wind capacity reached 3.5 GW. Industrial installations required large areas of land. When solar energy began to develop in Ukraine, 2 ha of land corresponded to 1 kW of power. Over time, technologies became more advanced, surfaces decreased, in some cases rotating mechanisms were implemented, and to produce 2 MW, only 1.4 ha of land could be used. Due to the upcoming post-war relocation of many types of economic activity as well as the population’s “change of address” to western and central parts of Ukraine, such significant free land areas where large industrial power plants could be developed will likely no longer be available. The map of solar activity in western Ukraine practically corresponds to the southern part of the country, hence the potential for PV installations is still considerable. As for the wind energy, it is a little trickier, with winds of 6-8 m/s characteristic only of the Zakarpattia and Prykarpattia regions. There, thanks to the mountainous landscape, aerodynamic currents are created. In other regions, according to experts, it will not be possible to construct large wind power plants, since generators with a capacity of 5 MW or more require higher wind speeds. Therefore, large industrial power plants will not be built in western Ukraine. As for distributed generation, these are power plants up to 20 MW, and they should dynamically develop in the post-war structure of electricity production as distributed generation will be necessary for the future stability of the energy system and can provide electricity to both industry and infrastructure.

Ukrainian Energy Transformation

Currently, the Ukrainian energy sector is going through a difficult period of transformation. After the war will have ended, the situation should improve, but Ukraine is currently dependent on fossil fuel imports, whereas many thermal power plants are damaged and non-operational. Thus, it is necessary to urgently develop RES, such as photovoltaic and wind energy, to replace the consumed fossil fuels and reduce dependence on imports.

Nonetheless, one of the problems that arise from the production of energy from RES is their instability. Therefore, conventional energy and heat generation systems were used to oversee peak loads. Currently, most of them are damaged to a degree exceeding 50% and cannot play the same role in the post-war period. It seems that in spite of all that, they will be rebuilt, assuming that the energy consumption structure will change, and industry will start to develop again. Power plants will gain new importance and will play a crucial role in ensuring the reliability of local infrastructure and industry. Furthermore, actions will be taken to create energy communities and local distribution centres that will ensure the stability of the energy system at the local level. The aim is to create one distribution centre for every 1 to 3 regions, which could connect renewables, heat generation, and hydroelectric power plants. This way, such cooperatives will balance the power in the local energy system and also operate in all market segments: daily operations, next day, balancing, and ancillary services.

Settlements between market participants would take place within a day, so there would be no deficits in settlements for renewable sources, as was the case before the war. For effective use of small distributed power plants, distribution network operators will be appointed. Ukrainians are already switching to a higher voltage level of 20 kV to reduce electric energy losses during transmission. As a result, the quality of electricity supply services to customers will improve.

Legal changes to attract investment

Serhij Zasowienko, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland, pointed out that in recent years, thanks to the introduction of the green tariff model in Ukraine, there had been an increase in installed RES capacity. At the beginning of 2022, the installed RES capacity reached 9.5 GW, with investments in the industry exceeding USD 12 billion. Currently, about one quarter of the installed RES capacity is located in occupied territories. The situation is particularly difficult for wind power plants, with about 80% of installed capacity located in the occupied areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. About 20% of the power plants are completely damaged, many destroyed or looted by the occupying forces. Despite these circumstances, even during the war, Ukraine ensures the fulfilment of its obligations to investors in the field of renewable energy. This is one of the priorities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy. Regarding the future of the country, like the rest of Europe, the creation of future energy balances will be based on RES. According to the “National Action Plan for the Development of Renewable Energy until 2030” and the “National Energy Strategy of Ukraine”, the share of renewable energy should reach 25% by 2030. Currently, the parliament has submitted a package of laws to the government for consideration, such as “On Stimulating Local Production of Electricity from Alternative Energy Sources” and “On Improving the Conditions for Supporting the Production of Electricity from Alternative Sources” as well as further legislation related to energy projects. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy is working on market solutions and facilitation for investors regarding the development of energy. The government is already inviting investors to become active players on the Ukrainian market, because with the end of the war, the physical reconstruction must begin, rather than just the administrative process.

The situation in wind energy

Olexander Podprugin pointed out that there are currently about 35 wind farms connected to the transmission grid in Ukraine with a total capacity of 1.7 GW. Energy is one of the most aggressive military frontlines. An energy war is being waged, with atomic blackmail and attacks on nuclear power plants. It is difficult to estimate the losses in infrastructure in a credible way, as many installations, including wind turbines, are located in hostile territory and are thus inaccessible. Only 20% of the turbines are located in the unoccupied territories of Ukraine. Ukrainian wind energy, which was operational last winter, made a significant contribution to the survival of Ukrainians, providing them with the basic minimum of energy and often being the only available source.

Despite the ongoing war, the construction and installation processes of wind power plants continue in a few locations. There are currently two projects in the pipeline, in Mykolaiv and in Odesa regions, with a total capacity of ca. 150 MW, expected to be launched in the spring. Unfortunately, for most projects, work is not being carried out due to occupied ports and blocked logistics.

The reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy system should be based on clean energy sources, primarily wind generation. The Ukrainian government’s recovery and development plan provides for a significant increase in wind and solar plants to at least 10 GW. As for green energy generation, over 30 GW of RES are planned for hydrogen production. Research conducted in various regions of Ukraine shows that many large power plants and fairly large wind farms using the best and most powerful turbines currently available can be built in Ukraine. We are talking here about both onshore and offshore wind farms. The potential for Ukrainian offshore wind power is immense and could theoretically be as high as 250 GW in installations located in the Black and Azov Seas, of course, after de-occupation and opening up investment opportunities. However, much still needs to be done to give this momentum, including regulatory changes such as reducing barriers to connecting new power plants, simplifying permit systems, and simplifying procedures for obtaining both environmental and construction decisions. Separately, many changes need to be developed in legislation concerning land and sea use, including connecting new wind power plants to the grid. From a technical standpoint, efforts should be made to increase the flexibility of Ukraine’s energy system so that it can accommodate more renewable energy.

Existing barriers that can be eliminated

According to our interviewees, administrative deadlines are also barriers to RES development, as power plants whose construction has been halted due to the war have missed their deadlines for commissioning. They will not be built on time and could be connected to the grid in the near future. Investors in Ukraine should be able to rely on promises being fulfilled, and capital and assets being protected. Therefore, a law should be adopted to extend the deadline for commissioning the planned power plants (on the same terms as in 2022). This may enable the execution of planned projects. Ambitious goals and a strategy according to which RES development will be based should be documented. Administrative decisions should have a validity period of 5-10 years and provide for conditional extension of the investment execution deadline. At the same time, the issuance of environmental documentation and construction permits should be expedited. It would also be worthwhile to implement regulations that allow investors to receive additional benefits for green energy.

Energy efficiency in the reconstruction of Ukraine

Igor Krechkevich, the technical director of the Ukrainian Energy Efficiency Fund, discussed the Fund, which is the only state organisation established by the Ukrainian government to stimulate energy efficiency and energy savings, mainly in the multi-family sector. Before the war, the fund successfully implemented the “Energodom” programme, which aimed to introduce energy-saving measures in the private and communal housing sectors. The organisation worked and is still working with residents’ self-government organisations, even during the war. Innovative programmes were implemented both from the state budget and with support from the EU, in particular Germany. After 24th February 2022, the war forced changes in the fund’s activities, and thus began the search for possible ways to provide additional support to the people of Ukraine. The “Rebuild Your Home” programme was developed, which to some extent can also be called energy efficiency activities, as many apartments and multi-family residential buildings were damaged and continue to suffer from air strikes, missile fire, explosions, leading to broken windows, roof and façade damage etc. “Rebuild Your Home” is also co-funded by the European Union. The programme helps residents’ self-government organisations rebuild damaged homes, repair windows, façades and roofs. Fortunately, it is now spring, and the enemy’s plans to prevent Ukraine from surviving the winter failed to succeed. The energy network survived, and the process of stabilising it continues. Therefore, there is a developed programme that allows families without a roof over their heads to return to their homes. The energy modernisation programme, which also operated during the previous year of the war, did not stop and paid out over UAH 1 billion (Ukrainian hryvnias) for modernisation purposes. An example is the city of Mykolaiv, which continued modernisation efforts even during shelling.

The development potential of Ukraine

According to Bloomberg, Ukraine ranked 8th out of 140 countries in 2019 in terms of attractiveness for investing in renewable energy. Investments lead to business development, influx of money, and profits. In this model, investment opportunities and an attractive rate of return are crucial. The Ukrainian government has already developed certain mechanisms and steps, while projects and laws are being created, and there is an understanding that RES represent a vast space for development and huge investment opportunities. Earlier in the text, offshore perspectives for wind energy were mentioned, which can only be developed with access to the Black Sea. Nevertheless, its potential is indeed enormous and has great significance in the European energy strategy, where Ukraine is a possible electricity supplier (especially to Germany, from which 75% of equipment imports originate).

The private residential sector is also active in the field of distributed energy, where small solar power plants are installed – not so much for business purposes as for powering homes. The war has shown that distributed generation and the development of energy cooperatives are necessary. They can develop basing on both multi-family residential buildings and private estates. There are already opportunities to work with the private sector in Ukraine, and after Ukraine’s victory over Russia, there will be an opportunity to enter a completely new market with new, investor-friendly rules. It seems that the scale of the planned investments will be sufficient to support Ukraine’s economy and help it transition to green energy. In western Ukraine, where there is less enemy shelling, preparations for the implementation of residential renewable energy are already underway. Ukraine has already been systemically integrated with the European market and had supplied energy to the EU market before the war broke out.

RES as a source of primary energy

Anastasia Vereshchynska, the Development Manager of the Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation, emphasised that the projects of the Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation are gaining attention not only in Ukraine, but also abroad. The foundation was established in response to the full-scale war in Ukraine and focuses on providing energy assistance primarily to Ukrainian civilian facilities, schools, and hospitals. The Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation focuses on a long-term, large, and very ambitious project to equip 100 schools and 50 hospitals in the country with hybrid solar power plants. The foundation is constantly looking for sponsors. The latest completed project was in a school in Irpin, where the installation had a capacity of 25 kW, satisfying a third of the school’s energy needs. The energy generated by the installed power plant also provides power for street lighting, so that children can safely return home from school, which is particularly important during winter.

On the other hand, the Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation installs hybrid power plants in hospitals to ensure the functioning of surgical theatres, maternity wards, and ICUs. Schools and hospitals participating in the programme are selected in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, which recommend institutions covered by the programme. These are chosen at a safe distance from the frontline and the Belarusian border. Investors do not want newly installed PV panels to attract the attention of the enemy, which could further endanger these facilities. One of the criteria for allocating investments is also having a bomb shelter at the school. Children and patients must be provided with safety.

The Energy Act for Ukraine Foundation’s programme also includes lessons on renewable energy and green solutions installed in schools. The organisation also informs why the development of renewables and conscious energy consumption is critical.

The third direction of the Foundation’s activities is the delivery of energy equipment to the civilian population. This is mobile equipment, mainly energy storage systems with PV panels that can be easily moved. It is important for hospitals located in strategic locations. Some of them have been delivered to field hospitals in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Polish and German donors were involved in the project. The Foundation also tries to draw attention to the fact that renewables can not only be a part of post-war reconstruction, but also an exceptionally effective way to provide immediate help. This need for help is urgent and desperate, and not as harmful to the environment as diesel generators. The organisation is not opposed to diesel generators, which it also buys when there is no alternative, but it draws attention to the existing proposals for energy storage systems that are a more forward-looking solution. The goal is to make energy consumers in Ukraine independent of fuels, so that people do not have to die due to a lack of access to electricity.

Polish perspective on RES in Ukraine in the context of health and safety

Senator Alicja Chybicka, Vice-Chair of the Health Committee, member of the Senate Committee on Climate and Vice-Chair of the Environmental Committee, noted that several laws related to RES are currently being processed in Poland, a national milestone. The entire world is striving to use renewable energy, which is currently the cheapest source of energy. We can use wind, water and sun. As we need wider access to the transmission grid today, we also need to learn how to store energy better. In the opinion of Senator Chybicka, it is important that children in Ukraine are taught about clean environment. Most diseases, not only cancer, have their origin in negative factors related to the climate and environment, not only universally understood, but also in what we eat and breathe. Cancer, which we now have a genetic accumulation of, needs an initiator to activate the gene – these can be found in the air, water or food.

The war in Ukraine has caused numerous countries to focus on RES development. Nowadays, we provide Ukraine with many generators, because we need to provide electricity to residents right now, but assistance must be planned in such a way that these green solutions remain in Ukraine after the war.

How does Polish business currently fare in Ukraine?

Karol Kubica, Manager of the Foreign Trade Office in Kyiv at the Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH), assures that the economic cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is constantly developing. Poland is one of Ukraine’s most important trading partners, and Ukraine is also climbing higher in the national trade balance. The PAIH office has been operating in Kyiv since 2018. For the last 5 years, interest in Polish products and services has been steadily increasing. Polish businesses are also increasingly interested in investing in Ukraine and seek cooperation with local entities. Over the past 20-30 years, Poland has undergone a transformation and has been one big construction site. Now, our experiences can be useful to Ukrainian companies.

The issue of alternative energy sources is a topic that the entire world is currently facing, not just Ukraine. In Poland, there is quite a long investment process in RES, both due to legislation and investment schedules. For Polish businesses to enter into these investments in Ukraine, they must have guarantees, security, and prospects for adapting legislation for foreign investors provided by the government. The inquiries from the renewable energy industry received by PAIH represented a few percent per year, usually totalling about 700 inquiries. Despite the ongoing war, these trends are similar. PAIH educates and presents investment prospects, but representatives of the agency believe that education alone is not enough. So far, about 1,800 entities interested in rebuilding Ukraine have registered, of which 33% represent the construction and energy sectors. The renewables sector, which includes not only energy companies but also energy-efficient buildings, is a part of this sector.

Developing business in Ukraine

Polish companies may not be visible in the renewable energy sector on a daily basis in Ukraine, but they participate in the broadly understood RES supply chain. These are suppliers of equipment and technologies who offer their solutions. Both Polish state-owned companies such as Orlen, PGNiG or Unimot Energy, as well as other private sector companies operate in Ukraine. However, businesses also like stability and not always report to government agencies, implementing investment assumptions independently. PAIH often intervenes when there is a problem with the administration, such as when Polish factories operating in Ukraine face difficulties connecting additional power demand. An example of support from PAIH may be ensuring an increase in the capacity of power lines when, after investing, additional production lines are launched. Ukraine’s accession to the EU structures is still quite distant and will require, among other things, adapting legislation, which should in turn improve investment conditions. However, Polish sectors such as construction, food and energy are already present in Ukraine.

Money for investments in Ukraine for Polish companies

Tenders related to the reconstruction of critical infrastructure in which Polish companies can participate are announced on the website https://odbudowaukrainy.paih.gov.pl/ and on the website of the Ministry of Development and Technology. These are funds allocated for various purposes. The pool of funds can amount to EUR 100-200 million for a single grant.

Currently, Ukraine is declaring what it needs and what needs to be rebuilt in order for it to function properly. Without energy, there is no business, without business there are no taxes or jobs, and then economic emigration increases. On 1st December 2022, PAIH held industry consultations for entrepreneurs, including those representing the energy industry. During such meetings, PAIH presents the scale of destruction and the possibilities of entering the market, but mainly emphasises that Polish businesses should cooperate with Ukrainian entrepreneurs, share their technology, use preferential loans offered by, among others, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, and insure transactions with KUKE. We should not only be competitors on the Ukrainian market, but the best solution is to find a long-term partnership on the Ukrainian side. Poland and Ukraine together would be unbeatable in Europe. PAIH is already preparing domestic businesses for this.

Cooperation with private and state-owned companies in Ukraine

Konstantin Magaletskyi who represented the Green Recovery Fund Ukraine explained how a fund focused on investments in green energy in Ukraine operates. Its task is to rebuild damaged renewable energy installations and build new ones. From the perspective of Ukraine’s future, this is not only beneficial, because of the use of green energy, but also because of the possibilities of decentralising energy production. Ukraine has experience in this area from previous years, when it exported its green energy to European countries. According to Konstantin, it is best to invest in the private sector, because most of the funding currently goes through the public sector, which is more formalised. A good example may be the operation of a private port: while investment in a state-owned port is greater, the ROI is higher in a private port. The reconstruction of Ukraine will progress much faster with the involvement of the private sector than if only central administration were involved.

Ukraine is already producing surplus green energy and is able to export it. The prospect of damage to a RES farm is now negligible. Furthermore, presently, energy production in Ukraine is stable and it does not need to be imported from abroad. The green energy market is developing steadily. Due to the fact that Ukraine is a large country, there is a need for collateral from large financial institutions for investments planned in this country.

Polish experience in the RES industry vs. knowledge of the Ukrainian market

Janusz Gajowiecki, President of the Polish Wind Energy Association, stressed that the industry is counting primarily on the development of RES in Poland, for instance through appropriate legal regulations. Onshore wind energy will develop all over Europe, and Poland should be a powerhouse in this respect. At the same time, companies from the Polish renewables industry have relations with investors from Ukraine. This sector is well developed in terms of substantive and project-related issues. Industry-specific knowhow is already available in Ukraine, which is why bilateral talks are incredibly detailed and at a high level.

The issue of wind energy in the context of RES is critical. Its impact on the national energy system is enormous. The installed capacity of 10 GW often provides 30% or more energy to the system. Poland has become a kind of hub for foreign companies employing experts from Poland and abroad. The potential of wind power installations in Poland is the largest in the CEE region. Ukraine, Romania or Croatia have all a relatively smaller development potential than Poland, even though Ukraine to a certain degree also has this potential. All companies, private and state-owned alike, are looking at a package of laws that are to change the regulations and simplify investments on the Ukrainian market. They already have projects ready for implementation, the entire permitting is in place, including grid connection, along with analyses of the latest available technologies, which are both ground-breaking and can reach up to 50% of the achievable power. This means that a 6 MW turbine can produce 3 MW over a year.

The UN will also support the development of wind energy. A model of cooperation is currently in the works, with such issues as who is to own farms that are going to be built with European funds among relevant topics. Nowadays, the RES industry is aware of the mission to create something extraordinary, to revolutionise the Ukrainian energy sector. PWEA, hand in hand with the Ukrainian association, are implementing the project “Work service for Ukraine” which helps find a job in the industry.

Unless the 700-metres-rule for wind energy is liberalised, wind energy development will not reach its peak dynamics over the next 8 years. Then the solution for investors will be to engage their remaining capabilities in Ukraine. Possibilities of transmitting green energy from Ukraine to Polish companies are already being analysed. Soon, no foreign investment will stand a chance in Europe without green energy. Without 100% green energy, no Western company will think about opening a new factory in Poland or Ukraine.

Procedures for obtaining permits for RES construction in Ukraine

The issue of permitting in Ukraine is currently similar to how it functions in Europe. There are some good practices that have already been implemented. In Europe, there are presently efforts to simplify and shorten the entire process, as stated in the adopted Re-Power EU package published last year. The regulations indicate that processes related to, among others, spatial planning, duration, and the amount of documentation require to issue environmental decisions should be shortened. Time is of the essence here, because we will need green energy in the short term. This technology is already proven and environmentally safe, so certain procedures can be abandoned or proceeded in a template manner.

Ukraine is prepared when it comes to environmental conditioning specialists and other requirements. The RES industry is one of the few sectors in the country that is corruption-free and transparent. The number of companies operating on the market is large enough to avoid centralisation or monopolising activity in the hands of the state or oligarchs. Therefore, it is a safe part of the market and economy.

Poland has many companies that are not well-known, but produce equipment for wind farm construction. Practically every element of wind turbines in Poland involves Polish companies. They manage logistics, materials, and construction to a full extent. Despite the war, entities associated in PWEA receive many inquiries from Ukraine regarding the implementation of wind projects. These investments are carried out all the time, also with the help of Polish companies.

The energy structure in Ukraine is very outdated and looks similar to the Polish one in the 1990s. By rebuilding the infrastructure, which has been destroyed by 40-50%, Ukraine can create the most modern energy system in Europe, adapted to the EU system. At the moment, however, there are no funds for this purpose and unless the world and foreign institutions help, Ukraine will not recover.

 

See more: 13.04.2023 The role of RES in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine

Position of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers: regulatory changes announced by the Ministry of Health will affect the development of telemedicine companies in Poland

Warsaw, 25th April 2023

Position of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers: regulatory changes announced
by the Ministry of Health will affect the development of telemedicine companies in Poland

  • Telemedicine is one of the strongest trends in how the world develops nowadays, and Poles are valued specialists and programmers who create great tools in this field of innovation.
  • The Ministry of Health has announced that new regulations are to combat “prescription machines” – unfortunately, the solutions may in real life also affect companies offering remote medical consultations, whose purpose might be to provide a patient with an e-prescription.
  • Telemedicine companies in Poland contribute to greater access to healthcare for patients. Too restrictive regulations, especially in the light of the introduction of a harmonised, cross-border e-prescription within the EU, court the risk of pushing domestic companies out of the market and replacing them with entities registered outside the country.
  • The Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers appeals to the Ministry of Health to be open to dialogue and not to proceed with hasty amendments which are therefore imperfect, and additionally far-reaching and affecting the development of telemedicine in Poland.

Telemedicine is the future of medicine around the world as it facilitates access to medical care for patients, primarily in the context of system overload and staff shortages. The possibility of obtaining a quick diagnosis (e-consultation) and appropriately selected therapy (e-prescription) is a solution for those patients who cannot wait in a long queue to see a doctor. These are people who are simply sick and require immediate treatment or suffer from a chronic condition and merely need to quickly purchase a prescription to ensure they continue to take their medication.

During COVID-19, telemedical solutions were considerably promoted and widely used with the approval of the Ministry of Health. Some of them, such as the e-prescription, were ahead of their time and, having entered into force shortly before the outbreak of the pandemic, enabled patients to safely continue therapy. For some time, however, we have been observing a disturbing shift in the practice of the Ministry of Health by tightening the regulations in the direction of limiting or simply excluding the possibility of benefitting from telemedicine. Presently, solutions are being announced that are to be a blow to the so-called “prescription machines”. And one should stress in this context the fact that no court or administrative authority has confirmed the widespread occurrence of this type of phenomenon, and it only exists in press publications. In fact, most of this market consists of entities in which issuing (or not issuing) a prescription is always preceded by a remote medical consultation.

Telemedical services do not work automatically and are not conducive to fraudulent prescriptions for an uncontrolled amount of drugs. Honest websites, before they decide to prescribe a specific pharmaceutical, collect medical history from patients using an IT system that supports their work. It is always the doctors’ task, thanks to which they can fully devote their time to their patients. The doctors during the teleconsultation are also fully responsible for the diagnosis and therapy prescribed to their patients on this basis. The fee applies to a medical visit, and it is a g cheaper than a visit to a stationary facility – therefore, these portals significantly increase the price availability of medical services.

In addition to price, time is another principal factor. Due to staff shortages, access to doctors in Poland is limited. The problem concerns not only specialists, but also general practitioners, especially during periods of increased incidence (such as the flu season or a pandemic). This is a major obstacle both for working people, who often must change their professional plans to make it to a doctor’s appointment, as well as the elderly (who often require immediate advice), or for example those chronically ill who need to maintain the continuity of treatment. Telemedicine and similar solutions to an e-prescription following a remote consultation effectively remedy these problems. Now even in crisis situations – for instance, a sudden lack of constantly taken medications or an unforeseen trip abroad – patients can safely continue their therapy.

An important fact in the context of the plans of the Ministry of Health is the work on the implementation of a cross-border e-prescription at the European Union level. The introduction of this solution will mean that an e-prescription issued in an EU member state can be filled in any other EU country. Under normal circumstances, these circumstances would be considered as an opportunity – Polish innovative companies could internationalise and conquer foreign markets. However, if proposed solutions are adopted in Poland, companies registered in the country will have much worse conditions for doing business than their foreign competitors. The latter, in turn, will be able to freely enter the Polish market. As a result, instead of expanding their operations and conquering European markets, Polish companies may be pushed out of the domestic market and replaced by foreign entities.

If the scenario presented above comes true, taxes paid by reliable and honest telemedicine companies will not go to the Polish budget.

Another extremely important thread is the question of entrepreneurs’ trust in the state. A whole series of regulatory initiatives, such as the introduction of e-prescription, were intended to foster the development of telemedicine. Companies operating ethically and caring for the well-being of their patient had the full support of key decision-makers in introducing products increasing the availability of medical services. Such a sharp turn undermines trust in the state and its laws alike, both of which are particularly important when doing business.

To sum up, Telemedicine is one of the strongest trends in how the world develops nowadays. Creating digital services, supporting the work of doctors, building patient databases that have their treatment history built-in- this is the future of medical services. A future from which there should be no turning back – especially in Poland, where we suffer from an obvious shortage of practicing doctors, which results in gigantic queues for patients.

See more: 25.04.2023 Position of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers: regulatory changes announced by the Ministry of Health will affect the development of telemedicine companies in Poland

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